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2004 ANNUAL SURVEY:
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN SPORTS LAW
INTRODUCTION

This article is a survey of sports law cases during the period of January 1,
2004 to December 31, 2004. This article does not encompass every case from
the past year but is an attempt to highlight those cases that have further
defined the unique area of sports law practice. To provide clarity, this article
is divided into topics based on a particular focus. With tens of cases having
been decided in the past year, this survey demonstrates that the field of sports
law is still thriving and continues to make a lasting impact on the legal system.
AGENTS

Sports agents play a considerable role in the field of sports law through
their involvement in the negotiation of contracts and representation of athlete
clients. Because agents often represent a number of players, jurisdictional
issues can arise. In the following case, the court addressed the issues of
jurisdiction over an athlete agent.
SportrustAssociates International,Inc. v. Sports Corp.
In Sportrust Associates International,Inc. v. Sports Corp.,l the Eastern
District of Virginia found that an agent who represented two Norfolk Admirals
hockey players did not have the requisite contact with Virginia to create
2
personal jurisdiction.
The plaintiffs, who represented NHL players, sued the defendants, who
also represented NHL players, and claimed that the defendants defamed their
reputations, conspired against them, and tortiously interfered with their
representation. 3 As their defense, the defendants contended that Virginia had
no personal jurisdiction over .them.4 As the defendants' only connection with

1.
2.
3.
4.

304 F. Supp. 2d 789 (E.D. Va. 2004).
Id. at 794.
Id. at 790-9 1.
Id. at 791.

MARQUETTE SPORTS LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 15:2

Virginia was their representation of two Norfolk Admirals hockey players,
unrelated to this case and they spent only one day in the state, the court
determined that this contact was not substantial enough to establish personal
jurisdiction over the defendants. 5 Accordingly, the court granted the
6
defendants' motion to dismiss.
ANTITRUST LAW

Antitrust law is applied to create a more competitive market in an attempt
to provide the optimal price and variety of products to consumers and to
prevent monopolization. Antitrust law applies in a unique manner in the area
of sports. Because sports, especially professional sports, are confined to a
single league or association, these entities must be given special allowances in
order to maintain production of sports, while further maintaining a balance and
preventing abuse of consumers. In the past year a prolific antitrust lawsuit
was decided involving Maurice Clarett's unsuccessful antitrust challenge to the
NFL's age eligibility rule. What follows is an explanation of this case as well
as a discussion of other applications of antitrust analysis, namely in the area of
participation restrictions imposed on collegiate teams.
Clarett v. NFL
In Clarett v. NFL,7 the Second Circuit denied former Ohio State
University running back Maurice Clarett's bid to enter the NFL a year early
and upheld the NFL's age eligibility rule by concluding that the nonstatutory
8
labor exemption applied to the rule.
During his freshman year, Clarett was a successful running back at Ohio
State. 9 His college career came to a halt when the NCAA suspended him from
football after his first season for NCAA rules violations.10 Clarett sought to
enter the NFL draft because he could not play college football, but was
rejected due to the NFL's age eligibility rule that required three full college
football seasons to have elapsed since his high school graduation."I Clarett
sued the NFL claiming that its age eligibility rule violated section one of the

5. Id. at 793-94.
6. Id. at 794.
7. Clarett v. NFL, 369 F.3d 124 (2d Cir. 2004).
8. Id. at 125.
9. Clarett v. NFL, 306 F. Supp. 2d 379, 387 (S.D.N.Y. 2004), stay denied, 306 F. Supp. 2d 411
(S.D.N.Y. 2004), rev'd in partand vacated in part, 369 F.3d 124 (2d Cir. 2004).
10. Id at 388.
11. Id.
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Sherman Act. 12 To consider Clarett's claim, the court first examined the
NFL's collective bargaining agreement with its players.1 3 Initially, the circuit
court determined that the nonstatutory labor exemption did not apply. 14 The
court then applied a quick look rule of reason antitrust analysis and concluded
that the rule was anticompetitive in nature and that the NFL could not offer
any legitimate procompetitive justifications for the rule. 15 Furthermore, the
court stated that even if the NFL could offer a legitimate procompetitive
16
justification, less restrictive means were available to implement the rule.
Accordingly, the court granted summary judgment to Clarett 17 and denied the
NFL's request for a stay of the decision until after the draft. 18
On appeal after granting the NFL's request for a stay,' 9 the Second Circuit
Court of Appeals held that the nonstatutory exemption applied to the eligibility
rule. 20 Finding that the NFL had a collective bargaining relationship with the
players' union, 2 1 the court concluded that the rule was a mandatory subject of
bargaining because it affected the wages and working conditions of current
NFL players.22 Even though the rule was not expressly mentioned in the
collective bargaining agreement, the court found that the provision in the
collective bargaining agreement embodying the union's agreement not to
challenge the league's constitution and bylaws - the documents which stated
the rule - to be sufficient evidence that the two sides had considered the
issue. 23 Thus, because the court found that the nonstatutory exemption
applied to the eligibility rule and that Clarett's claim subverted federal labor
policy, the court upheld the eligibility rule and denied Clarett's entry into the
24
2004 draft.

12. Id.at 390.
13. Id.
14. Id.at 392-97.
15. Id.at 405-09.
16. Id. at410.
17. Id.at411.
18. Clarett v. NFL, 306 F. Supp. 2d 411, 411 (S.D.N.Y. 2004), rev'd in part and vacated in part,
369 F.3d 124 (2d Cir. 2004).
19. Clarett,369 F.3d at 129-30.
20. Id.at 125.
21. Id.at 138.
22. Id. at 139-41.
23. Id. at 142.
24. Id.
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Morris Communications Corp. v. PGA Tour, Inc
In Morris Communications Corp. v. PGA Tour, Inc.,25 the Eleventh

Circuit Court of Appeals found that the PGA did not violate section two of the
organizations to follow certain regulations in
Sherman Act by requiring media
26
scores.
real-time
distributing
To monitor golf scores during a tournament, PGA developed a real-time
scoring system (RTSS). 27 As the PGA forbids cell phones and other handheld
devices because of the potential disruption to play, the RTSS is the only
source of golf scores for all tournament participants and can be obtained only
at the PGA media center. 28 For media organizations to access the media
center, they must obtain a free press credential and agree to delay publication
of the scores until thirty minutes after the player's shot or the PGA publishes
the score on its web site. 29 Additionally, they must agree not to sell the
30
scoring information to a third party without buying a license from the PGA.
Due to these regulations, Morris, a media company, alleged that PGA has an
unfair advantage and violated section two of the Sherman Act by
monopolizing the internet market, refusing to deal, and monopoly leveraging
of the internet market. 3 1 Agreeing with the district court, the Eleventh Circuit
Court of Appeals held that even if PGA had monopoly power in the relevant
market, a valid business justification existed for the PGA's actions because it
was trying to prevent Morris from "free-riding" on the PGA's RTSS
technology. 32 Moreover, the court found that Morris could not prove that the
PGA's business decision was pretextual. 33 Accordingly, the court upheld
34
summary judgment in favor of the PGA.

Worldwide Basketball & Sport Tours, Inc. v. NCAA
In Worldwide Basketball & Sport Tours, Inc. v. NCAA, 35 the Sixth Circuit
concluded that an antitrust challenge to an NCAA rule failed due to the

25. 364 F.3d 1288 (1 1th Cir. 2004).
26. Id. at 1298.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.

Id. at 1290.
Id. at 1291.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1291-92.

32.
33.
34.
35.

Id.
Id. at 1298.
Id.
388 F.3d 955 (6th Cir. 2004).
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challengers having failed to define a relevant market. 36
Concerned that many big-name basketball schools were disproportionately
entered into certified basketball tournaments, the NCAA enacted rule 98-92
which prevented teams from entering into more than one certified tournament
in an academic year and more than two certified tournaments every four
years. 37 However, the promoters of certified tournaments claimed that this rule
was designed to prevent them from making money at certified events and
brought an antitrust suit against the NCAA. 38 The trial court granted a
permanent injunction to Worldwide, and the NCAA appealed. 39 The relevant
market was not readily apparent, therefore, the court determined that the trial
court erred by using a quick-look analysis. 40
Furthermore, because
Worldwide had not defined the relevant market, the court ruled that
Worldwide could not prevail on its antitrust claim. 4 1 Accordingly, the court
42
reversed the district court's judgment.
MetropolitanIntercollegiateBasketball Ass'n v. NCAA
In Metropolitan Intercollegiate Basketball Ass'n v. NCAA, 4 3 the Southern
District of New York determined that the Metropolitan Intercollegiate
Basketball Association (MIBA) brought a valid antitrust claim against the
NCAA4 4 and that a full rule of reason analysis was necessary to determine
whether certain NCAA rules violated the Sherman Act. 45
MIBA organized the National Invitational Tournament (NIT) each year. 46
Although the NIT was popular for many years, its popularity had waned in
recent years. MIBA felt much of the decrease in popularity was attributable to
NCAA rules. 4 7 Filing suit against the NCAA, the MIBA claimed that the
NCAA's Commitment to Participate Rule, One Postseason Tournament Rule,
the End of the Playing Season Rule, the automatic qualification of conference
champions to the NCAA Tournament, and the NCAA's 65-team bracket were
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.

Id. at 963.
Id. at 957.
Id. at 957-58.
Id. at 958.

Id. at961.
Id. at 963.
Id. at 964.
337 F. Supp. 2d 563 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
44. 339 F. Supp. 2d at 549-52.
45. 337 F. Supp. 2d at 573.
46. Id. at 566.
47. Id. at 566-68.

536
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Finding that the
anticompetitive in violation of the Sherman Act. 48
Commitment to Participate Rule was an agreement between several entities
and, therefore, subject to section one scrutiny, the court determined that a per
se analysis was inappropriate because the NCAA needed some horizontal
restraints to function. 49 Furthermore, the court determined that a complete
rule of reason analysis was needed because the rule's adverse effect was not
blatantly obvious. 50 Lastly, the court denied MIBA's summary judgment
motion because a question of fact existed as to51whether the rule was enacted
with the specific intent to suppress competition.
Subsequently, the NCAA filed its own summary judgment motion on all
five of the rules MIBA claimed were anticompetitive. 5 2 Concluding that the
rules were commercial and were not protected from antitrust scrutiny, 53 the
court examined the rules under the rule of reason. 54 MIBA was able to show
that the relevant market was Division I men's college basketball postseason
tournaments, the NCAA had market power in that market, and that a genuine
issue of material fact existed as to whether the rules were anticompetitive.
Therefore, summary judgment was inappropriate. 55 Similarly, the court found
that a material issue of fact existed for MIBA's section 57two claim 56 and the
court denied the NCAA's motion for summary judgment.
ARBITRATION

Arbitration plays an important role in professional sports based on the
authority provided to arbitrators under the collective bargaining agreements of
most professional sports leagues. The following cases demonstrate the
difference between decisions regarding the procedure of arbitration, which
generally fall under the authority of the arbitrator, and decisions regarding
whether a particular issues is of the substance to be decided by an arbitrator,
which generally fall under the authority of the courts.

48. Id. at 568.
49. Id. at 569-71.
50. Id. at 573.
51. Id. at 573.
52. Metro. IntercollegiateBasketballAss'n, 339 F. Supp. 2d at 547.
53. Id. at 547-49.
54. Id. at 549.
55. Id. at 549-52.
56. Id. at 552.
57. Id.

2005]

ANNUAL SURVEY

Dunkelman v. CincinnatiBengals, Inc.
In Dunkelman v. CincinnatiBengals, Inc.,58 the Court of Appeals of Ohio
determined that a dispute between season ticket holders and a football team
was not arbitrable due to the season ticket holders never having agreed to
59
arbitrate potential claims.
To obtain season tickets at their new stadium, the Cincinnati Bengals
required fans to purchase a seat license. 60 The team had patrons sign a
"Charter Ownership Agreement" (COA) to purchase the seat license and then
sent them another agreement to sign, a "Club Seat License Agreement"
(CSLA). 6'
However, the CSLA added extra provisions, including an
arbitration clause and a default and acceleration provision that required
patrons to purchase season tickets during their lease, even if they did not wish
to purchase the tickets. 62 Some season ticket holders were dissatisfied with
this default and acceleration provision and brought suit against the Bengals for
negligent misrepresentation and fraud. 6 3 Finding that the contract between the
fans and the Bengals was formed when the fans signed the COA, the court
found that the fans never agreed to arbitrate any disputes. 64 Thus, the court
found that arbitration was inappropriate and remanded the case back to the
65
trial court.
Jacobs v. USA Track & Field
In Jacobs v. USA Track & Field,6 6 the Second Circuit declined to compel
arbitration for a petitioner who refused to abide by the governing rules of the
67
arbitration.
USA Track and Field accused world-class track athlete Regina Jacobs of
violating doping rules and threatened various disciplinary actions, including
banning her from the Olympics. 68 The parties agreed to arbitrate, but
disagreed on which rules controlled the arbitration and how the arbitrators
58. 821 N.E.2d 198 (Ohio Ct. App. 2004).
59. Id. at 204.
60. Id. at 200.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.

Id.
Id
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 200-01.
at 199.
at 204.
at 205.

66. 374 F.3d 85 (2d Cir. 2004).
67. Id. at 86.
68. Id.
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could be chosen. 69 The American Arbitration Association concluded that USA
Track and Field's Supplementary Procedures should control, and Jacobs
70
appealed contending that the Commercial Rules should apply. USA Track
and Field had not refused to arbitrate; therefore, the court determined that
Jacobs had no right to compel arbitration under the Commercial Rules because
the American Arbitration had found these rules inappropriate and therefore,
72
71
inapplicable to this arbitration. Accordingly, the court denied her petition.
Major League Umpires Ass'n v. American League of ProfessionalBaseball
Clubs
In Major League Umpires Ass'n v. American League of Professional
Baseball Clubs,73 the Third74Circuit upheld an arbitrator's decision regarding
the employment of umpires.
In 1999, many umpires grew unhappy over how Major League Baseball
(MLB) was supervising their employment. 75 In an effort to force MLB to
change its policies and comply with the no-strike clause in their collective
bargaining agreement (CBA), the umpires resigned in mass. 76 Nevertheless,
7 7 When the
this effort failed when MLB decided to hire replacement umpires.
umpires realized their move was futile, many tried to rescind their resignation
letters. 78 However, MLB had begun hiring replacements and only nineteen
79
open positions remained - all in the National League. MLB then proceeded
to allow nineteen National League umpires to rescind their resignations based
on their merit and skills, but accepted the resignations of thirteen National
80
League umpires and all nine of the American League umpires. These
twenty-two umpires then filed grievances under the CBA and demanded that
the grievances be arbitrated. 8 1 Denying MLB's motion to dismiss the
arbitration due to the dispute not falling under the scope of the CBA's
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 89.
72. Id.
73.
74.
75.
76.

357 F.3d 272 (3d Cir. 2004).
Id. at 289.
Id. at 275.
Id. at 276.

77. Id.
78. Id. at 277.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 278.
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arbitration provision, the arbitrator reinstated two American League umpires
and seven National League umpires with full back pay and benefits, but denied
reinstatement of the other umpires. 82 Both sides appealed, and the district
court upheld the majority of the arbitrator's decision. 8 3 Finding that the case
was arbitrable, 84 the appellate court determined that the arbitrator had a basis
to find that the umpires resigned, 85 did not misapply the CBA's merit and skill
criteria,8 6 and decided the case based on a logical reading that drew its essence
from the CBA. 87 Accordingly, the court upheld the arbitrator's decision. 88
COLLEGE SPORTS ISSUES

College athletes and universities face a number of legal issues in their
attempts to maintain the amateur status of collegiate athletics. For example,
one of the most publicized decisions in the area of college sports this year was
University of Colorado football player Jeremy Bloom's request for an
injunction to receive endorsement money. The cases discussed below include
Bloom's request as well as a number of other challenges to athletic
conference, university and NCAA rules as well as allegations of legal liability
to the same entities.
Bloom v. NCAA
In Bloom v. NCAA, 89 the Court of Appeals of Colorado denied an amateur
athlete's request to enjoin the application of NCAA rules to endorsement
income related to his professional skiing career. 90
Bloom, a professional skier and amateur football player at the University
of Colorado, sought an injunction so that he could receive income from
endorsements and modeling related to his skiing career while playing NCAA
football. 91 After establishing that Bloom had standing as a third-party
beneficiary of the NCAA rules, 92 the court found that NCAA rules clearly

82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 282.
85. Id. at 284.
86. Id. at 285.
87. Id. at 288.
88. Id. at 289.
89. 93 P.3d 621 (Colo. Ct. App. 2004).
90. Id. at 622.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 624.
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forbid a professional athlete from receiving compensation from endorsements
or paid media activities while competing in amateur contests. 93 With regard to
Bloom, the appellate court agreed with the trial court's conclusion that the
application of NCAA rules as to Bloom was rationally related to the legitimate
purpose of maintaining amateurism in intercollegiate athletics as compared to
professional sports.94 Thus, because Bloom did not show a reasonable
probability of success on the merits, nor did he show that the NCAA
arbitrarily applied its rules to him, the court denied Bloom's request for an
95
injunction.
Morris v. Administrators of the Tulane EducationalFund
In Morris v. Administrators of the Tulane EducationalFund,96 the Court
of Appeal of Louisiana concluded that athletic trainers were not "health care
providers," but remanded the case to determine whether they were "physical
97
therapists.
98
Julie Morris was a nationally-ranked tennis player at Tulane University.
During the season, she injured her foot and received treatment from a Tulane
athletic trainer, who diagnosed her with a foot strain. 99 One month later,
Morris still complained of pain; however, a Tulane athletic trainer cleared her
to play in a tournament.1 00 Soonafter, a doctor diagnosed a stress fracture in
Morris's foot. 10 1 Although Morris underwent several surgeries, her foot was
permanently damaged, ending her career. 10 2 She sued Tulane, alleging that
the trainer was negligent in diagnosing her injuries. 10 3 Tulane argued that its
trainers fell under the coverage of the Louisiana Medical Malpractice Act
(LMMA) with a dilatory exception of prematurity, and the trial court granted
the exception. 10 4 On appeal, the court determined that an athletic trainer was
not included in the statutory definition of health care provider, and thus, was

93. Id.at 625-26.
94. Id.at 626.
95.
96.
97.
98.

Id.
891 So.2d 57 (La. Ct. App. 2004).
Id.at61.
Id. at 58.

99. Id.
100. Id.
101.
102.
103.
104.

Id.
Id.
Id.at 58-59.
Id. at 59.

ANNUAL SURVEY

2005]

not covered by the LMMA. 10 5 However, the court needed more evidence to
determine whether the athletic trainers could be considered physical therapists,
who would be covered by the LMMA. 10 6 Therefore, the court reversed the
prematurity, but remanded the
trial court's granting the dilatory exception of
07
case to determine the trainers' qualifications. 1
University System of Maryland v. The Baltimore Sun Co.
In University System of Maryland v. The Baltimore Sun Co., 10 8 the Court
of Appeals of Maryland held that a university must disclose its coach's
employment contract and other compensation information and that contracts
between the coach and third parties must be reviewed separately to determine
whether
whether the coach received compensation because he was a coach and
10 9
the compensation was intimately connected with the coach's duties.
Through the Maryland Public Information Act, Baltimore Sun sports
reporter Jon Morgan requested copies of University of Maryland football
coach Ralph Friedgen's employment contract and other documents regarding
monetary
and
agreements,
broadcast
bonuses,
incentives,
any
0 Although the university disclosed Friedgen's annual salary, it
compensation."I
did not disclose any other information because it said the information was
protected under the Public Information Act as personnel and financial
information. 111 To avoid a possible lawsuit, Coach Friedgen eventually
disclosed the information the reporter sought; however, when the reporter
asked similar information about the head basketball coach, Gary Williams, the
university again gave the coach's salary information, but refused to give any
112
information on other income or provide a copy of his university contract.
As the employment contracts, amendments, and side letters were essential to
understanding how the university compensated the coaches, the court held that
the university must disclose them.1 1 3 In contrast, as to records of contracts
between the coach and third parties, the court determined that the lower court
must view the documents, in camera, to determine whether Coach Williams
received the compensation solely because he was the basketball coach and
105.
106.
107.
108.

Id. at 61.
Id.
Id. at 62.
847 A.2d 427 (Md. 2004).

109.
110.
111.
112.

Id. at431, 443.
Id. at428.
Id.
Id. at 429-30.

113. Id. at441.
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whether the compensation was intimately related to his activities as coach. 114
Only if the lower court found the documents to be so connected with his
position as coach would the university have to disclose them. 115
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

Sports involve an inherent conflict between the rights of athletes and the
rights of the viewing public. Based on this conflict, there are occasions in
which one or both of these groups may experience violations of their
constitutional rights. In the following cases the free speech, due process, equal
protection, and freedom of religion rights of athletes and sports fans are
described.
Reid v. Kenowa Hills Public Schools
In Reid v. Kenowa Hills Public Schools,1 16 the Court Appeals of Michigan
upheld a school district's denial of participation in interscholastic sports to
117
home-schooled children.
The plaintiffs, who were home-schooled for religious reasons, wanted to
participate in the public school's interscholastic sports program." 8 However,
the school district denied their request due to Michigan High School Athletic
Association (MHSAA) rules that required athletes to be enrolled in a public
school for at least twenty hours a week. 1 9 After being denied participation,
the plaintiffs filed suit and alleged that the school's denial violated Michigan's
statutes, the students' freedom of religion, and the students' equal
protection. 120 Courts have recognized a distinction between non-core
programs, such as band, that do not need to be taught in nonpublic schools and
extracurricular activities, such as football. Courts have also previously decided
that participation in extracurricular activities is a privilege, not a right. As
such, the court held that the Michigan statutes do not require public schools to
grant home-schooled students access to their interscholastic sports
programs. 12 1 The court further held that the plaintiffs' religious freedom was
not jeopardized because the plaintiffs were free to be home-schooled under the
114. Id.at 443.
115. Id.
116. 680 N.W.2d 62 (Mich. Ct. App. 2004).
117. Id. at 65.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 66-68.
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MHSAA's rule and the government did not coerce the plaintiffs into violating
their religious beliefs. 122 Lastly, the court held that with regard to the Equal
Protection claim, the enrollment rule was neutral on its face and concluded
that the enrollment rule was rationally related to the legitimate governmental
purpose of eliminating recruiting and preventing "ringers" from participating.
123 Thus, the home-schooled students could not be prohibited from joining the
1 24
public school's sports teams.
Angstadt v. Midd-West School District
In Angstadt v. Midd-West School District,125 the Third Circuit upheld a
school district's declaration of a charter school student as ineligible for
athletics because the regulations were rationally26related to the school district's
goals and did not affect the student's education.'
Although she was home-schooled, the Midd-West School District allowed
Megan Angstadt to play interscholastic basketball during seventh and eighth
grade. 127 When she began high school at a special cyber charter school that
did not have a basketball team, Midd-West allowed her to play basketball
within its school district. 128 However, in the middle of the season, Midd-West
declared Angstadt ineligible for the rest of the season and the next season
because she did not attend any "real time" courses and studied a curriculum
that the State Board of Education had not approved. 129 Her parents brought
suit and claimed violations of freedom of association, due process, and equal
protection. 130 The court determined that there was no violation of the
plaintiffs freedom of association because the requirements to play basketball
did not affect Angstadt's education.13 1 Because no property interest exists in
sports participation, the court determined that the Angstadts' due process claim
failed. 132 Finally, using a rational basis analysis, the court denied the
Angstadts' equal protection claim because Midd-West's goals of ensuring good
academics, attendance, and physical education were rationally related to its
122. Id. at 70.
123. Id. at 71.
124. Id.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.

377 F.3d 338 (3d Cir. 2004).
Id. at 344-45.
Id. at 340.
Id. at 341.
Id. at 341-43.
Id. at 341.

131. Id. at 344.
132. Id.
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decision to prohibit
regulations. 133 Thus, the court upheld the school district's
134
team.
district's
school
the
on
playing
from
Angstadt
Priesterv. Lowndes County
In Priesterv. Lowndes County, 135 the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held
that a high school student who was injured in a racially-motivated attack failed
to show that the school had violated his due process and equal protection
36
rights. 1
Priester, a black high school football player, suffered an eye injury when a
137
white teammate intentionally poked him in the eye during a football drill.
Additionally, Priester alleged he was subject to racial epithets from teammates
138
and a coach and was assaulted by teammates who threw rocks at him.
Although the high school principal investigated the incident, no one claimed to
have seen anyone hit Priester, and the school refused to pay his medical
expenses. 139 Priester filed suit, alleging denial of his due process and equal
protection rights and claiming negligence and intentional torts that resulted in
emotional distress and physical injury. 14 0 The court upheld the dismissal of
Priester's intentional tort claim because Priester filed the case after the oneyear statute of limitations had expired. 14 1 The court upheld the dismissal of
Priester's section 1983 claim due to his failure to allege a conspiracy between
the coaches and teammate. 142 Because no special relationship existed between
Priester and the school during an extracurricular football practice and no
conspiracy existed, the court found no state action had occurred, and thus, no
due process claim existed. 14 3 Finally, the court ruled that the school did not
violate the Equal Protection clause because Priester failed to show that the
had treated him
school did not investigate his claims or that the school
144
differently than other students, therefore, his claims failed.

133. Id. at 344-45.
134. Id.
135. 354 F.3d 414 (5th Cir. 2004).
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.

Id. at 423-26.

141.
142.
143.
144.

Id.at 420.
Id.
Id.at 423-24.
Id.at 424.

Id.at417.
Id.
Id.418.
Id.
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Tun v. Fort Wayne Community Schools
145
the Northern District of
In Tun v. Fort Wayne Community Schools,

Indiana concluded that a school violated a wrestler's substantive due process
him for being photographed while showering in the
rights when it expelled
146
room.
locker
school
While high school wrestler Brandon Tun was showering in the high school
locker room, a teammate took his picture.' 47 The teammate later gave Tun the
negatives, and when the school found out about this incident, it expelled Tun
for allowing the teammate to photograph him, not reporting the incident, and
for possessing the negatives. 14 8 Although Tun's expulsion was later
overturned, he brought suit and claimed that the school violated his procedural
due process rights and substantive due process rights and claimed that the
wrestling coaches were negligent in failing to properly supervise the locker
room. 149 The court determined that Tun's negligent supervision claim failed
because it was not foreseeable that someone would take pictures and that the
coaches could not prevent such behavior. 150 Finding that Tun had no right to
cross-examine the photographer or examine his statement and that the hearing
examiner was not biased, the court concluded that the school had given Tun a
15 1 In
fair hearing and had not violated his procedural due process rights.
contrast, the court found that the school had violated Tun's substantive due
process rights when it expelled Tun in part for violating the rule against
possessing pornography because expulsion was not an articulated option for a
violation of this rule.' 52 Furthermore, the school violated Tun's substantive
due process rights when it expelled him for participating in inappropriate
153
sexual behavior or public indecency because he did not violate this rule.
Lastly, the court determined that the school principal and hearing examiner
were not entitled to qualified immunity because they knew or should have
known that some evidence that Tun violated school rules was necessary before
they could expel him. 154 As a result, the court granted Tun's summary

145. 326 F. Supp. 2d 932 (N.D. Ind. 2004).
146. Id. at 946-51.
147. Id. at 934.
148. Id. at 934-36.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.

Id. at 936-37.
Id. at 939-41.

Id.

Id. at 947.
Id. at 947-50.
154. Id. at 951.
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judgment motion on his substantive due process claim. 155
Jennings v. City of Stillwater
In Jennings v. City of Stillwater,156 the Tenth Circuit determined that a
57
police department had not failed to adequately investigate her rape claim. 1
Oklahoma State University (OSU) student Alison Jennings reported to
police that several OSU football players raped her at a party. 15 8 The police
investigated her claim, collected evidence, and interviewed witnesses. The
district attorney did not file charges, however, based on his belief that the case
could not be proved beyond a reasonable doubt, due to Jennings's reluctance to
testify and her inability to specifically remember some events. 15 9 Claiming
that the police did not adequate investigate her allegations, Jennings filed a
section 1983 action against the city and two police officers. 160 Examining
Jennings's procedural due process claim, the court concluded that her claim
could not be sustained because she had no property interest in prosecuting the
players. 16 1 Jennings next claimed that she was denied access to the courts
because the police destroyed the rape kit and did not investigate her
allegations sufficiently. 162 The court determined that Jennings's claim failed
because the only remedy for this claim would be damages for her loss of a
civil tort claim against the football players, and she had already received
compensation from the university and players for that loss. 1 6 3 As for
Jennings's equal protection claim that she was singled out and treated unfairly
because the police wanted to protect the football players, the court concluded
that the non-prosecution was not discriminatory and Jennings failed to show
that similar persons were treated differently; thus, the court affirmed the
64
dismissal of Jennings's claims. 1

155.
156.
157.
158.

Id.
383 F.3d 1199 (10th Cir. 2004).
Id. at 1215.
Id. at 1200.

159. Id. at 1201-04.
160. Id. at 1200.
161. Id. at 1207.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 1209.
164. Id at 1215.
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Pinardv. ClatskanieSchool District
In Pinardv. Clatskanie School District,165 the court found that a petition
calling for a high school coach's resignation was not constitutionally-protected
speech under section 1983. 166
The plaintiffs, a group of high school basketball players, were unhappy
with their coach's use of intimidation and harsh language. 167 To remedy this
situation, the plaintiffs petitioned the coach to resign, however, the coach did
not resign and gave the petition to the school administrators, who suspended
the plaintiffs indefinitely. 16 8 After unsuccessfully utilizing the school's
grievance procedure, the plaintiffs brought this case under section 1983
alleging that the school district violated their First Amendment rights. 169 To
succeed on their First Amendment claim for retaliation, the plaintiffs had to
show that they were participating in a constitutionally-protected activity, that
the defendant's actions chilled an ordinary person from engaging in that
protected activity, and the activity was the substantial motivation for the
defendant's adverse action. 170 Due to the plaintiffs' speech not being political
or of public concern, the court concluded that the plaintiffs' speech was not
constitutionally-protected and granted summary judgment to the school
district.171

Bellecourt v. City of Cleveland
In Bellecourt v. City of Cleveland,172 the Supreme Court of Ohio
determined that the police's arrest of protestors did not infringe on173their
constitutional rights because the arrest was predicated on safety reasons.
On Opening Day of 1998, a group of protestors gathered near Jacobs Field
to demonstrate against the Cleveland Indians' name and mascot.17 4 During the
protest, several people burned an effigy of Chief Wahoo and Little Black
Sambo. 175 After extinguishing the fire, the police arrested the group, but
165. 319 F. Supp. 2d 1214 (D. Or. 2004).
166. Id. at 1219.
Id. at 1215-16.
Id. at 1216.
Id. at 1216-17.
Id. at 1217.
Id. at 1219.
820 N.E.2d 309 (Ohio 2004).
173. Id.at 312-14.
174. Id. at311.
175. Id.

167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
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prosecutors did not charge them. 176 The group brought a section 1983 action
and claimed that the arrests were baseless in violation of their right to free
speech. 177 Although the court found that the speech was protected, the court
determined that because the protest occurred during windy conditions and the
protestors used an accelerant to make the fire burn more rapidly, the police's
duty to protect the public from a potentially dangerous fire outweighed the
protestors' free speech rights. 178 Thus, the police had a right to arrest the
79
protestors. 1

Ward v. Santa Fe Independent School District
In Ward v. Santa Fe Independent School District,180 the Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals concluded that the plaintiffs lacked standing for their First
Amendment claim because they had already received a favorable judgment in
18 1
the district court.
The Santa Fe school district implemented a rule forbidding students from
praying or referring to a deity in pre-game football speeches. 182 Before the
first football game of the season, Marian Ward, who was chosen to be the
student speaker for the football season, and her parents brought an action
against the school district alleging that Marian's rights to free speech and free
exercise of religion were violated. 183 The trial court found that the school
district had violated Marian's First Amendment rights and awarded her
nominal damages of one dollar and attorney's fees. 184 The Wards appealed
because the district court did not address the merits of their constitutional
claim. 185 The court held that the Wards had received all the relief they had
requested, therefore, the court determined that the Wards did not have standing
to bring an additional claim and affirmed the trial court's judgment. 18 6

176.
177.
178.
179.
180.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 312-14.
Id. at314.
393 F.3d 599 (5th Cir. 2004).
181. Id. at 603.
182. Id. at 601.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 602.
185. Id. at 602-03.
186. Id. at 608.
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Crue v. Aiken
In Crue v. Aiken, 18 7 the Seventh Circuit found that a university violated
the free speech rights of its faculty members when it prohibited them from
contacting prospective student-athletes about the university's controversial
mascot. 188
At the heart of this suit was the controversy over the University of
Illinois's mascot Chief Illiniwek - whether the university should keep a Native
American mascot or change its mascot to something more politically correct.
A group of faculty members wanted to contact prospective student-athletes
about this controversy and the racial stereotypes. 189 However, when the
university's chancellor, Michael Aiken, heard about this plan, he sent an e-mail
to faculty and informed them that they could not contact prospective studentathletes without permission from the Director of Athletics because of possible
NCAA rule violations. 190 After the court granted the faculty members an
injunction for the restraint on their free speech rights, Illinois appealed. 19 1
Finding that the faculty members' free speech interest outweighed the
university's fear of NCAA sanctions, the court granted a declaratory judgment
to the faculty members. 192 Additionally, the court rejected Aiken's claim of
qualified immunity because case law clearly indicated that public employees
could freely speak on matters of public concern. 193 Thus, the court affirmed
94
judgment in favor of the faculty members. 1

Bocachica v. Pennsylvania State Horse Racing Commission
In Bocachica v. Pennsylvania State Horse Racing Commission,195 the
Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania determined that a racing commission's
ban of a jockey was not arbitrary, capricious, nor unreasonable and did not
require the reading of the Miranda rights. 196

187. 370 F.3d 668 (7th Cir. 2004).
188. Id. at 680.
189. Id. at 674.
190. Id. at 674-75.
191. Id. at 677.
192. Id. at 680. The court granted a declaratory judgment because the university had retracted
the e-mail and accepted the resignation of Chancellor Aiken. Id. at 677.
193. Id.
194. Id. at681.
195. 843 A.2d 450 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2004).
196. Id. at 453-55.
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The plaintiff, a jockey, was accused of using an illegal battery during a
horse race at Philadelphia Park. 197 Although no battery was found on his
person, a battery was found in his vicinity. 19 8 One week later, the State Horse
Racing Commission forced Bocachica to give an interview and subjected him
to intense questioning for two hours. 199 After two hours, Bocachica, in an
attempt to leave, admitted to using a battery two years ago, but never during a
race or at Philadelphia Park. 20 0 Because he confessed, the commission banned
him from racing at the Park and effectively ended his racing career. 20 1 Later,
Bocachica recanted and alleged that he did not know what he had signed and
was never given his Miranda rights; however, the commission still upheld the
decision to ban him from the racing track. 20 2 On appeal, the court found that
Bocachica's self-incrimination rights were not violated because he was not
subject to a criminal proceeding. 20 3 Additionally, the court found that
Bocachica's conduct was detrimental to the perception of horse racing as a
whole and the commission sufficiently investigated the claim.20 4 Accordingly,
arbitrary,
the court determined that the commission's decision was not
20 5
capricious, or unreasonable and upheld the commission's decision.

CONTRACTS

Contracts are involved in every level of sports participation from
recreational league waivers to multi-million dollar professional contracts. The
following cases discuss the requirements necessary in order for such contracts
to be upheld as well as the affect a contract may have on a party's ability to
bring a lawsuit in a particular case.
Sweat v. Big Time Auto Racing, Inc.
In Sweat v. Big Time Auto Racing, Inc.,20 6 a California appellate court
determined that an express waiver did not apply to the claim of a spectator

197. Id. at 451.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 453.
Id. at 454.
Id. at 455.

206.

12 Cal. Rptr. 3d 678 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004).

2005]

ANNUAL SURVEY

who was injured when the bleachers he was sitting upon collapsed during an
20 7
auto race.
A spectator sitting in the pit area at an auto race sued the speedway owner
for negligence after the bleachers he was sitting upon collapsed. 2 8 At issue
was whether the waiver he signed before being allowed to enter the pit area
denied him recovery for his injuries. 20 9 Examining the agreement, the court
found the language excluding liability was ambiguous as it could apply to
spectators in or out of the pit area. 2 10 Turning to extrinsic evidence that people
who had not signed the release were allowed into the pit area after the race, the
court concluded that the agreement was for the purpose of assuming the risk of
injury related to racing. 2 11 As defective bleachers were not related to racing,
the court found that the spectator had not assumed the risk of injury. 2 12 Thus,
2 13
the spectator could proceed with his claim.
Francov. Neglia
In Franco v. Neglia,2 14 a New York appellate court determined that a
material issue of fact existed as to whether a minor assumed the risk of his
injuries from kickboxing and held the release signed by the minor
2 15
unenforceable.
During his first kickboxing class, a fourteen-year-old boy was injured
when his partner threw him during a maneuver. 2 16 He brought a negligence
suit against the martial arts academy, and the academy brought a motion for
summary judgment on the basis that the student had signed a release and
assumed the risk of his injuries. 2 17 The court determined that the release was
invalid because minors did not have the capacity to enter into such
agreements. 2 18 As for assumption of the risk, the court found that a material
issue of fact existed as to whether the risks were foreseeable to the minor, how
the minor was injured, and whether the martial arts academy exercised
207. Id. at 1308.
208. Id. at 1304.
209. Id.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.

Id. at 1305.
Id. at 1306.
Id.at1308.
Id.
776 N.Y.S.2d 690 (N.Y. App. Div. 2004).
Id.at 691-92.

216. Id. at 691.
217. Id.
218. Id.
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reasonable care. 2 19 Thus, the court denied the martial arts academy's motion
220
for summary judgment.
Milicic v. Basketball Marketing Co.
In Milicic v. Basketball Marketing Co.,22 1 the Superior Court of
Pennsylvania upheld an injunction that allowed a professional basketball
player to disaffirm an endorsement he signed as a minor and seek other
222
endorsement contracts.
When he was sixteen, Serbian basketball player Darko Milicic entered into
an endorsement agreement with the Basketball Marketing Co. 2 23 After he
turned eighteen and became eligible for the NBA draft, Milicic disaffirmed the
agreement so that he could sign more lucrative deals. 224 However, Basketball
Marketing did not accept the disaffirmance and wrote letters to other
companies that were negotiating with Milicic stating that Milicic was still
under contract, thereby preventing Milicic from finalizing any deal. 2 25 Milicic

sought and received a temporary restraining order and injunction, and
Basketball Marketing appealed. 226 The court found that the injunction was
proper due to Milicic's disaffirmance of the contract within a reasonable time,
the significant harm to Milicic's ability to negotiate, the greater chance of
injury to Milicic without an injunction, and the injunction's restoration of
Milicic to his status before he signed the contract. 227 Additionally, the court
found that Basketball Marketing's letters were enough evidence to support a
prospective contractual
valid claim for intentional interference with
229
relations. 22 8 Thus, the court upheld the injunction.
Frankv. Mathews
In Frank v. Mathews,230 a Missouri appellate court allowed an injured

219. Id. at 692.
220. Id.
221. 857 A.2d 689 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2004).
222. Id. at 694-97.
223. Id. at 691.
224. Id. at 692.
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. Id. at 694-96.
228. Id. at 697.
229. Id.
230. 136 S.W.3d 196 (Mo. Ct. App. 2004).

2005]

ANNUAL SURVEY

horseback rider's claim to survive summary judgment because the waiver she
signed was invalid and the activity that caused her injuries was not an inherent
231
risk of horseback riding.
During her eighth riding lesson, at her instructor's request, Melody Frank
used a riding crop on the horse she was riding. 232 When she did so, the horse
jolted, and Frank fell off the horse. 23 3 She brought a negligence suit alleging
that the riding instructor failed to use reasonable care in determining whether
she could safely use the riding crop and safely ride the horse in question. 234 In
a summary judgment motion, the stables asserted that the release Frank signed
barred them from any liability and that the accident arose from activities that
were inherent risks of horse riding. 23 5 Examining the language of the release,
the court determined that it was invalid because it merely restated the Equine
Liability Act and was not a clear and unmistakable waiver.2 36 According to the
court, the issue of negligence in providing the riding crop was related to
negligent supervision and not an inherent risk of horse riding so a material
issue of fact existed with regard to this issue and summary judgment was
237
denied.
Gershon v. Regency Diving Center, Inc.
In Gershon v. Regency Diving Center, Inc.,238 a New Jersey appellate
court determined that a family could bring a wrongful death claim, even
though the decedent waived his right to it. The family did not waive its right
and the waiver was against public policy.2 39
An experienced scuba diver, Eugene Pietroluongo signed up for advanced
diving lessons with the Regency Diving Center. 24 0 To determine the skill
levels of Pietroluongo and other students, a Regency instructor took them
scuba diving. 24 1 During this test, some of the divers, including Pietroluongo,
became lost.24 2 Although the divers immediately searched for him, his corpse
231. Id. at 198-205.
232.
233.
234.
235.

Id. at 198.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 198-99.

236.
237.
238.
239.

Id. at 201.
Id.
845 A.2d 720 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2004).
Id. at 726-28.

240. Id. at 723.
241. Id.
242. Id. at 724.

MARQUETTE SPORTS LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 15:2

was not found until the next day. 243 The medical examiner ruled his death an
accidental drowning. 244 Subsequently, his family brought a wrongful death
action against Regency. 24 5 At issue was whether a release Pietroluongo
signed that waived any wrongful death action arising from Regency's
negligence precluded his family's claim. 246 As Pietroluongo's heirs did not
waive the right to bring a wrongful death action, the court determined that they
could bring their claim. 247 Furthermore, the court concluded that precluding
against public policy, and therefore, the family
the family's claim would be 248
could continue with its claim.
Echols v. Pelullo
In Echols v. Pelullo,249 the Third Circuit determined that a contract

between a boxer and a promoter that did not state the amount of compensation
250
the boxer would earn for each bout was not invalid for indefiniteness.
Antwun Echols signed a promotional agreement with Arthur Pelullo for
25 1
Pelullo to arrange and promote three boxing matches per year for Echols.
As part of the agreement, Pelullo paid Echols a set minimum amount for each
bout, depending on whether and where it was televised, but could renegotiate
these amounts if Echols ever lost a bout.25 2 One month after signing the
agreement, Echols lost a match, and Pelullo began negotiating the
compensation on a match-by-match basis. 253 Echols became dissatisfied with
Pelullo's monetary offers, filed suit, and, and among other things, claimed that
the agreement was unenforceable because it was indefinite. 254 Examining the
agreement, the court determined that the purpose of the agreement was to
establish a relationship between Echols and Pelullo. 2 55 As such, the
compensation for these bouts was not material and essential to the agreement
and the indefinite amounts did not make the contract so indefinite as to be
243. Id.
244. Id.
245. Id. at 722.
246. Id. at 724.
247. Id. at 726.
248. Id. at 729.
249. 377 F.3d 272 (3d Cir. 2004).
250. Id. at 276.
251. Id. at 273.
252. Id.at 273-74.
253. Id.at 274.
254. Id.
255. Id. at 276.
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257
invalid.2 56 Therefore, the contract was upheld.

Adams v. Continental Casualty Company
In Adams v. ContinentalCasualty Company,2 58 the Eighth Circuit Court of
Appeals interpreted an insurance policy clause that denied benefits to those
"riding in a vehicle or device for aerial navigation" to include parachuting. 2 59
After Michael Adams died while skydiving, his wife, Brandee, submitted
an insurance claim for benefits under the accidental death policy. 2 60 However,
Continental Casualty, the Adams' insurer, denied her claim because the policy
forbade coverage for losses resulting from "riding in any vehicle or device for
aerial navigation." 26 1 Brandee claimed that a parachute was not "a vehicle or
device for aerial navigation." 262 The court determined that parachuting
involved navigation because the parachuter has some control over direction
and that Michael was "riding" in the parachute because he was harnessed to
it. 26 3 Thus, the court found that the policy applied to parachuting and
Continental Casualty could deny benefits to Brandee under the policy. 264
Wright v. Sport Supply Group, Inc.
In Wright v. Sport Supply Group, Inc.,265 the Court of Appeals of Texas
dissolved a temporary injunction arising from a non-compete agreement,
which prevented a salesman from selling sporting goods to any institutional
customers in several counties, and remanded the case for further
26 6
proceedings.
Dan Wright sold sporting goods to youth leagues and other groups for
Sport Supply Group (SSG) in southeastern Texas. 2 67 While employed, he
signed a non-competition and confidentiality agreement. 268 Approximately

256. Id.
257. Id.at 280.
258. 364 F.3d 952 (8th Cir. 2004).
259.
260.
261.
262.
263.

Id.at 955.
Id.at 953.
Id. at 954.
Id.
Id.at 955.

264. Id. at 955-56.
265. 137 S.W.3d 289 (Tex. App. 2004).
266. Id.at 299.
267. Id.at 292.
268. Id.
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to
two years later, Wright left SSG and began selling similar sporting goods 269
Riddell.
competitors,
SSG's
of
one
for
territory
the same groups in the same
SSG sued for injunctive relief to enforce the non-competition and
confidentiality agreement, and the trial court granted the injunction. 270 Wright
appealed claiming that SSG could show no adequate remedy or irreparable
injury, the agreement had no consideration, and the agreement was
unreasonable. 2 71 With regard to the remedy and injury claim, the court found
that although SSG's damages were not presently ascertainable, SSG had a
remedy at law and Wright did not offer any evidence to rebut the presumption
that SSG was irreparably injured. 272 For the consideration claim, the court
found that the agreement had consideration because in exchange for Wright's
signing the agreement, SSG gave Wright access to computer programs,
customer databases, and training. 2 73 Conversely, on the final claim, the court
held that the agreement's terms were unreasonable because they limited
Wright from having any contact with any potential customers in the sporting
goods market in several counties. 274 The court stated that it could enforce the
injunction if it knew who Wright's customers were when SSG employed him;
the court dissolved the temporary injunction and remanded the case for further
275
proceedings.
CRIMINAL

Unfortunately the areas of sports law and criminal law intersect on
occasion. In the following cases, courts considered a wide variety of criminal
issues, including sentencing enhancers, probable cause, and criminal liability
for sports-related fights.
State v. Guidugli
In State v. Guidugli,276 the Ohio Court of Appeals upheld the assault
conviction of an athlete who punched an opposing player in a fight during an
277
intramural basketball game.

269. Id.
270. Id. at291.
271. Id. at 293-97.
272. Id. at 293-94.
273. Id. at 297.
274. Id at 298.
275. Id. at 299.
276. 811 N.E.2d 567 (Ohio Ct. App. 2004).
277. Id. at 572-77.
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During an intramural basketball game, Gino Guidugli and his teammates
278
Witnesses testified
got into a physical altercation with the opposing team.
279
The police
face.
the
that they observed Guidugli punching another player in
280
At trial,
arrested Guidugli, and he was charged with criminal assault.
because the evidence demonstrated that Guidugli had not acted in self-defense,
28 1
He was sentenced to one year
but in retaliation, the court convicted him.
probation with sixty days of home incarceration, counseling, a minimal fine,
and court costs. 282 Guidugli brought a motion to mitigate the sentence to
2 83
Guidugli then brought
community service, but the court denied the motion.
motions concerning the sufficiency of the evidence and the competency of
counsel. 284 Guidugli essentially waived his argument on the sufficiency of the
evidence by asserting self-defense, therefore, the court denied his first
motion. 285 Similarly, the court denied his other motion finding that Guidugli's
As a result, the court affirmed Guidugli's
counsel was effective. 286
287
conviction.
Carlislev. Ten Thousand FourHundredForty-seven Dollars in United States
Currency
In Carlisle v. Ten Thousand Four Hundred Forty-seven Dollars in United
States Currency,288 the Hawaii Supreme Court determined that probable cause
existed for a search of a participant in an illegal sports gambling operation, but
of the seized money because it was not
ordered the state to return some
2 89
gambling.
to
related
specifically
Using a pen register and trap and trace devices, police discovered that
Matsuji Shimabuku placed several bets worth $3,200 with an illegal sports
gambling operation. 290 Thereafter, police executed a search warrant of
Shimabuku's home and retrieved $9,997 from his pants pocket and $450 from

278. Id. at 569.
279. Id.
280. Id. at 570.
281. Id.
282. Id.
283. Id.
284. Id. at 570-72.
285.
286.
287.
288.

Id. at 572.
Id. at 576-77.
Id. at 577.
89 P.3d 823 (Haw. 2004).

289. Id. at 829-39.
290. Id. at 826.
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his closet shelves, as well as expired World Series pool tickets. 29 1 Shimabuku
challenged the seizure, and the court found that the property was properly
seized, but ordered the government to return $7,247.292 Shimabuku appealed
and claimed that the search was unlawful because no probable cause existed,
that the seizure exceeded the warrant's scope and that the seizure was unlawful
293
because the state did not prove the money was involved with gambling.
The court rejected Shimabiku's claims and found that probable cause existed
and that the police's seizure of the World Series tickets did not exceed the
warrant's scope because the tickets were related to gambling. 294 In contrast,
the court found that the state should have seized only $1,900 due to the fact
that Shimabuku placed $3,200 in bets and lost $2,280.295 Thus, the court
found the search warrant to be valid and ordered the state to return the excess
296
of the seized money to Shimabuku.
State v. Neri
In State v. Neri,29 7 the Court of Appeals of Kansas determined that a
sentencing enhancer was inappropriately applied to a man who forged checks
from a youth baseball organization because the children were not the victims
29 8
of the crime.
Don Neri was convicted of seven counts of forgery for stealing and
forging checks from the Olathe Youth Baseball Program's bank account. 2 99
Once the forgery became known, the bank reimbursed the program, and the
children in the program never learned about the forgeries. 300 Although Neri
was eligible for presumptive probation under Kansas's sentencing guidelines,
the court imposed the maximum sentence of thirty months. 30 ' The court stated
that the rationale for jail time was that the children of the youth program were
particularly vulnerable to Neri's actions.3 0 2 On appeal, Neri argued that the
organization, not the children, was the victim, and thus, the court should not
291. Id. at 826-27.
292. Id. at 827.
293. Id. at 827-28.
294. Id. at 829-33.
295. Id. at 835.
296. Id. at 838-39.
297. 95 P.3d 121 (Kan. Ct. App.2004).
298. Id. at 124.
299. Id. at 122.
300. Id.
301. Id.
302. Id.

2005]

ANNUAL SURVEY

have enhanced the sentence. 30 3 The court looked at the sentencing guidelines
and determined that the vulnerability enhancer was to be applied when the
vulnerability augments the facilitation of the crime. 30 4 The money belonged to
the program, not the children, and adults ran the program, thus, the court ruled
factor to the
that the sentencing court erred by applying the vulnerability
30 5 The case was remanded for resentencing. 30 6
sentence.
GENDER EQUITY ISSUES

Title IX has played a significant role in the development of sports and the
area of sports law in the past three decades. While female athletes are gaining
a stronger position in a number of sports contexts, there continues to be
disparities between the genders in some areas. The following cases address
challenges brought both by women and men as a result of their attempts to
further gender equality in sports. Specifically, in 2004, a number of
challenges were brought regarding the scheduling of women's sports seasons
and the effect of scheduling on women's opportunities for success,
achievement, and participation.
Communitiesfor Equity v. Michigan High School Athletic Ass'n
In Communities for Equity v. Michigan High School Athletic Ass'n
(MHSAA), 30 7 the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals determined that a high
it
school athletic association violated the Equal Protection Clause 30when
8
seasons.
non-traditional
during
sports
school
high
scheduled six girls'
A group of high school athletes and parents brought suit alleging that the
MHSAA's scheduling of sports (i.e., basketball was played in fall while in
forty-eight other states, it is played in winter) discriminated against girls based
on their gender in violation of the Equal Protection Clause, Title IX, and
Michigan law. 30 9 They argued that this discriminated against girls by
decreasing opportunities in to college recruiting, playing in club programs, and
playing in poor weather conditions. 310 After finding that the MHSAA was a

Id. at 123.
Id. at 123-24.
Id. at 124.
Id.
377 F.3d 504 (6th Cir. 2004).
308. Id. at 506.
309. Id. at 506-07.
310. Id. at 507-09.
303.
304.
305.
306.
307.
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state actor, 3 11 the court analyzed MHSAA's argument that its scheduling
maximized girls' participation in sports.3 12 Determining that disadvantaging
girls in the season schedules did not maximize participation, the court found
that the scheduling did not further the governmental objective and therefore,
that MHSAA violated the Equal Protection Clause. 3 13
McCormick v. School Districtof Mamaroneck
In a similar case, McCormick v. School District of Mamaroneck,3 14 the
Second Circuit Court of Appeals determined that a high school was violating
Title IX when it scheduled girls' soccer out-of-season to the girls'
3 15
disadvantage.
While almost all of the New York high schools offered girls' soccer in the
fall, the plaintiffs' high schools offered it in spring. 3 16 The state championship
playoffs were held only in the fall, and as a result, the plaintiffs were on the
only teams that were not able to participate in the playoffs. 3 17 Additionally,
the girls faced conflicts with playing in the Olympic Development Program for
soccer and with college recruiting, whereas the male soccer players at their
high school did not face the same disadvantages.3 1 Under Title IX, the
plaintiffs brought suit and requested an injunction to move the soccer
season. 3 19 Even though the plaintiffs did not play high school soccer, the court
found that they had standing because they would have played high school
soccer if the seasons were different. 320
Finding that the girls were
disadvantaged and that the disadvantage was significant, 32 1 the court further
concluded that the school could not justify the disparity. 322 To accommodate
the students, the court ordered the school either alternate the girls' and boys'
soccer seasons in the fall or move the girls' soccer season permanently to the
fall. 323 Thus, the plaintiffs won their Title IX claim. 324
311.
312.
313.
314.

Id. at 510-11.
Id. at 513.
Id. at 515.
370 F.3d 275 (2d Cir. 2004).
315. Id.at 302.
316. Id. at 280.
317. Id.
318. Id. at280-81.
319. Id. at283.
320. Id. at 284.
321. Id. at 294-96.
322. Id.at 299.
323. Id. at 302.
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Jennings v. University ofNorth Carolinaat Chapel Hill
In Jennings v. University of North Carolinaat Chapel Hill,3 25 the Middle
District of North Carolina dismissed a former college soccer player's sexual
harassment, Title IX, and invasion of privacy claims against and granted
summary judgment for the defendants because the behavior of the coaches and
the school did not constitute a violation of the plaintiff's educational
3 26
opportunities.
Melissa Jennings played for the university soccer team, which was
coached by Anson Dorrance. 32 7 Throughout her career, Jennings claimed that8
32
Dorrance made several sexual comments about her and her teammates.
After Jennings was cut from the team, she brought suit against Dorrance, other
coaches, and the university for violation of Title IX, invasion of privacy,
failure to supervise, and sexual harassment. 329 As Dorrance's conduct was not
so "severe, pervasive and objectively offensive" that it deprived Jennings of
educational opportunities, the court granted summary judgment to the
defendants for the Title IX and sexual harassment claims. 330 Similarly, on the
invasion of privacy claims, the court granted summary judgment to the
defendants because Dorrance's comments did not influence Jennings's decision
about procreation and Jennings was not forced to answer any questions about
her sexual activities. 33 1 Furthermore, Dorrance never intruded into her home
or personal records. 332 Finally, the court dismissed the failure to supervise
claim because Jennings had been unsuccessful in demonstrating any violation
of her constitutional rights. 333 Accordingly, the court granted summary
334
judgment to the defendants on all of Jennings's claims.
In another motion, the defendants moved to seal Jennings's deposition, her
academic transcript, her parents' depositions, and the depositions of another
soccer player and her parents. 335 The defendants asserted that the depositions
should be sealed because they contained potentially embarrassing and
324. Id.
325. 340 F. Supp. 2d 666 (M.D.N.C. 2004).
326. Id. at 675-78.
327. Id. at 668.
328. Id. at 669-71.
329. Id. at 673.
330. Id. at 675-77.
331. Id. at676-77.
332. Id. at 678.
333. Id. at 677-78.
334. Id. at 678.
335. 340 F. Supp. 2d at 679, 680-8 1.
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irrelevant comments about other female students' private lives and bodies and
that Jennings's academic record should be sealed because it was private and
irrelevant. 33 6 As Jennings had consented to her academic record's release and
no compelling government interest outweighed the First Amendment right to
access, the court denied the motion to seal the academic record. 33 7 Similarly,
the court denied the motion concerning the depositions because the students
had no reasonable expectation of confidentiality regarding the comments. 338
339
Thus, all records remained publicly available.
Howell v. North Central College
In Howell v. North Central College,340 the United States District Court for
the Northern District of Illinois refused to amend a former college basketball
player's claim to include Title IX retaliation and breach of contract. 34 1
While playing basketball for North Central College, Danielle Howell
alleged that the coach and other team members sexually harassed her because
she was heterosexual. 34 2 In her complaint, she alleged that North Central
violated Title IX, denied her due process, and caused her emotional distress. 343
The court denied this complaint, and Howell sought to amend the complaint to
include Title TX retaliation and breach of contract claims. 344 The court
dismissed the retaliation claim because the alleged harassment did not consist
of gender stereotyping. 34 5 In the contract claim, Howell alleged that she and
North Central had a contract based on the student handbook and policies, and
that through these documents North Central prohibited discrimination based
on sexual orientation. 34 6 The court dismissed this claim because it was a state
claim, and with the federal claims having been dismissed, the federal court had
no jurisdiction over the state claim. 34 7 As a result all of Howell's claims were
34 8
dismissed.
336. Id. at 681.
337. Id. at 683.
338. Id. at 683-84.
339. Id. at 684.
340. 320 F. Supp. 2d 717 (N.D. 111.2004).
341. Id. at 726.
342. Id. at 718.
343. Id.
344. Id.
345. Id. at 723-25.
346. Id. at 725.
347. Id.
348. Id. at 726.
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Mercer v. Duke University

In Mercer v. Duke University,349 the United States District Court for the
could receive attorney's
Middle District of North Carolina held that a plaintiff
350
claim.
IX
Title
original
her
fees after prevailing on
In October 2000, a jury found that Duke University head football coach
Fred Goldsmith had discriminated against Heather Mercer, who tried out for
his team as a placekicker, on the basis of her gender. 35 1 At issue in this
subsequent case was whether Mercer was entitled to attorney's fees due to her
3 52
Mercer
prevailing on her original Title IX claim against the university.
used a
the
court
therefore,
received only one dollar in compensatory damages,
35 3
First,
three-factor test to determine if Mercer was entitled to attorney's fees.
the court considered the degree of success Mercer achieved. 3 54 As her primary
goal of holding Duke liable for its indifference to her discrimination claims
355
was achieved, the court concluded that her success was not de minimus.
3 56
Finding that
Second, the court considered the significance of the legal issue.
the issue - whether Title IX prohibits gender discrimination in cases of female
athletes trying out for traditionally male contact sport teams - was novel and
significant, the court found Mercer's victory satisfied the second factor of its
358
The
test. 3 57 Third, the court considered the public goal of Mercer's lawsuit.
court found that Mercer's suit furthered an important public goal because the
Fourth Circuit had the chance to recognize that a cause of action exists under
Title IX in a situation like Mercer's. Mercer's suit brought attention to Title
IX's objective of fighting gender discrimination in federally-funded
educational institutions. 359 Thus, the court concluded that Mercer could

receive attorney's fees 360 and granted her a total of $349,243.96.361

349.
350.
351.
352.

301 F. Supp. 2d 454 (M.D.N.C. 2004).
Id. at 470.
Id. at456.
Id. at 458.

353. Id. at 459.
354.
355.
356.
357.
358.
359.
360.

Id.
Id. at 461.
Id. at 462.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 465.
Id. at 466.

361. Id. at 470.
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Mehus v. EmporiaState University
In Mehus v. Emporia State University,362 the District Court of Kansas
denied the university's motions to dismiss based on sovereign immunity and
363
failure to state a claim under Title IX.
Among other things, Maxine Mehus, head volleyball coach at Emporia
State University (ESU), alleged that the university discriminated against her
by paying her less salary and granting her fewer benefits, holding her to
different performance and employment standards, and denying her team the
same resources and financial assistance than similarly-situated male
employees. 364 Mehus brought these claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act, Title IX, and the Equal Pay Act (EPA). 36 5 In response, the university
brought motions to dismiss. 366 On the issue of sovereign immunity, the court
denied ESU's motion to dismiss and found that ESU was not immune because
Congress had properly abrogated the state's immunity for the EPA and validly
extended EPA claims to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. 367 The
court denied ESU's motion to dismiss on the Title IX issue and determined
that Mehus did not have to prove intentional discrimination under Title IX.
The court held that Mehus had a right of action under Title IX and allowed her
368
claims to proceed.
Simpson v. University of Colorado
In Simpson v. University of Colorado,369 the United States District Court
3 70
of Colorado ruled on pretrial motions concerning a Title IX action.
Lisa Simpson claimed the University of Colorado violated Title IX by
knowingly and deliberately remaining indifferent to its football players and
recruits' repeated acts of sexual harassment and in failing to take appropriate
measures after she was sexually assaulted and sexually harassed by players
and recruits. 37 1 Deciding on several pretrial motions, the court examined
Simpson's diary and decided to admit additional relevant diary entries, found

362. 295 F. Supp. 2d 1258 (D. Kan. 2004).
363. Id. at 1270-72.
364. Id. at 1260.
365. Id. at 1260-61.
366. Id. at 1261.
367. Id. at 1270.
368. Id. at 1274.
369. 220 F.R.D. 354 (D. Colo. 2004).
370. Id. at 361-66.
371. Id. at 357-58.
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565

good cause to require Simpson to undergo a mental health examination, and
determined that Simpson had to turn over the names of her therapists and
372
therapy records from the three years before the assault occurred.
Doe v. Green
In Doe v. Green,373 the District Court of Nevada found that a reasonable
jury could infer that a school violated Title IX and the Nevada child abuse
reporting statute with regard to a coach's sexual harassment and abuse of a
high school student.3 74
Doe, a high school student, mentioned to her teacher some concerns she
had about the assistant soccer coach, Jeremy Green. 375 These concems
included the way Green looked at Doe, the many sexually suggestive things
Green said to Doe, Green's calling Doe at home, and Green's telling Doe that
he had had sex with a former student. 376 The teacher reported Doe's concerns
to the principal, but upon the principal questioning her, Doe related that Green
did not make her uncomfortable, had not inappropriately touched her, and had
not engaged in sex with her. 377 However, the principal met with Green and
told him to act professionally with the students and not to communicate
personal feelings to the students. 378 Doe also told her parents about her
concerns, and her parents met with the principal who told them that he would
monitor Green and address the problem. 37 9 After that meeting, the principal
met with the athletic director and Green and reiterated that Green's actions
were inappropriate, but did not report Green's actions to family services or the
police. 380 However, Green's behavior did not improve, and he and Doe
eventually began having sex. 3 81 A few months later, a school official caught
the two having sex, and the police were notified. 3 82 Green pleaded guilty to
sexual seduction and open and gross lewdness charges and was sentenced to
prison. 383 Subsequently, Doe's family brought Title IX and negligence claims

372. Id. at 361-66.
373. 298 F. Supp. 2d 1025 (D. Nev. 2004).
374. Id.at 1034-40.
375. Id. at 1028.
376. Id.
377. Id.
378. Id. at 1029.
379. Id. at 1029.
380. Id.
381. Id. at 1030.
382. Id
383. Id.
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against the school.38 4 For the Title IX claim, Doe needed to prove that a
school official had actual notice of the discrimination, the school's response
failed to make the violator comply and amounted to deliberate indifference to
discrimination, and the school consequently denied her equal access to
education. 385 The court concluded that a reasonable jury could find that the
school had actual notice of the discrimination, that the school was deliberately
indifferent to the discrimination, and that the discrimination had a negative
effect on Doe's access to education 386 Similarly, for the claim of negligence
under Nevada's child abuse reporting statute, the court found that a reasonable
jury could find that the school officials failed to adequately report Green's
conduct. 387 In contrast, the court granted summary judgment to the school for
the failure to warn claim and negligent hiring claim due to the unforeseeability
of the risk to Doe and no evidence of the school's knowledge of Green's
claim of negligence
dangerous propensities. 38 8 Thus, Doe's Title IX claim and
389
judgment.
summary
survived
statute
under the reporting
National Wrestling Coaches Ass'n v. Departmentof Education
In National Wrestling Coaches Ass'n v. Department of Education,390 the
to the three-part Title IX test due to the
D.C. Circuit rejected a challenge
39 1
standing.
of
appellants' lack
The appellants were a group of organizations that represented several
collegiate male wrestlers, coaches, and alumni who had participated in
They
wrestling programs before the universities eliminated them. 39 2
challenged the three-part Title IX test contained in the 1979 Policy
Interpretation and 1996 Clarification alleging that it violated the Constitution,
Title IX, the 1975 Regulations, and the Administrative Procedure Act. 393 The
court found the appellants had no standing because their claimed injury could
not be redressed by the requested relief. 394 As universities independently
384. Id.
385. Id. at 1032-33.
386. Id. at 1034-38.
387. Id. at 1038.
388. Id. at 1039-40.
389. Id. at 1040.
390. 366 F.3d 930 (D.C. Cir. 2004), reh'g denied Nat'l Wrestling Coaches Ass'n v. Dep't of
Educ., 383 F.3d 1047 (D.C. Cir. 2004).
391. Id. at 933-34.
392. Id. at 933.
393. Id.
394. Id.
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decided to eliminate or reduce men's wrestling teams, the appellants could not
show that a ruling in their favor would alter the universities' decisions. 395
Additionally, even if the appellants had standing, the court stated that the
appellants' claim was further barred because they could have brought a private
action directly against the universities. 396 Thus, the appellants were
unsuccessful in their attempt to change Title IX. 397
The appellants appealed the decision and requested a rehearing en banc. 39 8
Finding that the appellants had only "unadorned speculation" that the court
could redress their injuries, the court concluded that the appellants had no
standing. 399 Moreover, the court stated that because the appellants had a
private cause of action against the universities, a claim could not be brought
against the Department of Education. 400 Therefore the appellants' petition was
40 1
denied.
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION

Despite the improvements in equality in the areas of gender, race, religion
and the like, several of the cases involving employment discrimination were
brought in the past year. The following cases discuss claims of discrimination
through sexual harassment, racially discriminatory statements, retaliation, and
Equal Pay Act violations.
Reed v. Unified School DistrictNo. 233
In Reed v. Unified School District No. 233,402 the District Court of Kansas
found a triable issue of fact existed for a former high school coach's
employment discrimination and retaliation claims, and therefore, denied the
school district's motion for summary judgment. 40 3
Reed, a cross country and track coach, was disciplined by her employer,
Olathe South High School, after she gave coaching advice to a competing
school's athlete at a track meet. 40 4 Although Reed felt her actions were
395. Id.
396. Id. at 933-34.
397. Id.
398. Nat'l Wrestling Coaches Ass'n, 383 F.3d at 1047.
399. Id.
400. Id.
401. Id.
402. 299 F. Supp. 2d 1215 (D. Kan. 2004).
403. Id.at 1219.
404. Id.at 1220-21.
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acceptable because she knew the athlete in question and knew the athlete was
not competing against any Olathe South runners, the school athletic director,
who had received several complaints about Reed for other actions, informed
her that she would be restricted in her coaching duties, she would not be
returning as coach next year, and he would not give any references to future
employers. 405 Shortly afterward, Reed gave the athletic director a letter in
which she informed him that he was discriminating against her because of her
gender, 40 6 and she later brought a suit alleging that the district's actions were
40 7
Analyzing the
unlawful employment discrimination and retaliation.
summary judgment motion under the McDonnell Douglas framework, the
court stated that Reed had to prove a prima facie case of discrimination by
showing that she was a member of a class that the statute protected, she
suffered an adverse employment action, and that the employer treated her less
favorably than others not in the protected class or that the action occurred
under circumstances that inferred discrimination. 40 8 The court found that Reed
40 9 the
had a prima facie case because she was qualified for the position,
4 10
athletic director's failure to recommend her was adverse to her employment,
and the district hired another coach for the job. 4 11 The burden then shifted to
the school to prove that it had a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its
actions. 4 12 The school ended Reed's employment because she coached the
other athlete and for other performance reasons, thus, the court found the
school had met its burden. 4 13 The burden then shifted back to Reed to prove
that the school's reasons were pretextual. 4 14 Reed met that burden by showing
that the school did not bring some of the complaints to Reed's attention and
did not assert the complaints were problematic until after she started the
the court denied the school district's summary
lawsuit. 4 15 Accordingly,
4 16
judgment motion.
Similarly, the court denied the school district's summary judgment motion

405. Id.at 1221.
406. Id.
407.
408.
409.
410.

Id. at
Id.at
Id. at
Id. at

1219.
1223.
1224.
1227.

411. Id.
412. Id. at 1228.
413. Id.
414. Id. at 1229-30.
415. Id.
416. Id. at 1230.
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on the retaliation claims. 4 17 Using the McDonnell-Douglas framework, the
court concluded that a jury could find Reed engaged in protected opposition to
discrimination, suffered an adverse employment action, and established a
causal connection between the protected activity and adverse employment
action with regard to the athletic director's refusal to recommend Reed to
potential employers and the non-renewal of her contract. 4 18
Brooks v. Southern University
In Brooks v. Southern University,4 19 the Court of Appeal of Louisiana
upheld sexual harassment, gender discrimination, and retaliation claims made
by a former coach against another coach and raised the award of damages and
420
fees to the victim.
Jean Brooks was a basketball coach at Southern University for six years
until the University informed her that it was not renewing her contract. 421 As
she had previously filed unsuccessful internal complaints alleging sexual
harassment and gender discrimination claims against Earl Hill, another coach,
she filed suit against Southern University for gender discrimination, sexual
harassment, and retaliation. 4 22 At trial, a jury found that Southern was guilty
of Brooks's claims. 42 3 On appeal, the court considered several issues from
both parties. 424 The court determined that the admission of prior sexual
harassment complaints against Hill, a hearsay statement made by another
sexual harassment victim, and that the questioning of another sexual
harassment victim did not warrant a new trial.4 25 Further, the court found no
error in the jury's verdict. 426 While the court determined that a judgment
notwithstanding the verdict was appropriate, it concluded that $65,000 was too
low an award and granted Brooks $200,000.427 Finally, because the court
increased the damages award, it also increased the attorney's fees to Brooks. 4 28

417. Id. at 1230-34.
418. Id.
419. 877 So.2d 1194 (La. Ct. App. 2004).
420. Id. at 1228.
421. Id. at 1198-99.
422. id. at 1199.
423. Id.
424. Id. at 1199-1200.
425. Id. at 1202-04.
426. Id. at 1221-24.
427. Id. at 1227.
428. Id. at 1228.
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Fuhrv. School District of Hazel Park
In Fuhr v. School District of Hazel Park,42 9 the Sixth Circuit Court of
after a school district
Appeals upheld a female coach's discrimination claim430
coach.
basketball
varsity
boys'
the
refused to hire her as
When the boys' varsity basketball coach retired, teachers Geraldine Fuhr
1
and John Barnett applied for the job. 43 Although Fuhr had been coach for the
girls' varsity basketball team for ten years as well as coach of the boys' junior
varsity and assistant coach of the boys' varsity basketball teams for eight
years, Barnett, who had coached the freshman boys' team for two years,
received the job due to the school board's concern about a female being the
boys' varsity coach. 432 Fuhr filed a Title VII claim and won damages and the
4 33
On appeal, the court found that Fuhr
job as boys' varsity basketball coach.
had suffered an adverse employment action due to the lower pay provided for
the girls' coaching job in relation to the boys' coaching job. Further, the court
affirmed the district court, stating that jury could find that the school
intentionally discriminated against Fuhr based on the school board's
statements and that the district court434did not abuse its discretion by giving Fuhr
the boys' varsity coaching position.
Horn v. University of Minnesota
In Horn v. University of Minnesota,435 the Eighth Circuit Court of
Appeals found that a former women's hockey assistant coach, who was paid
violation
less than another assistant, did not suffer a Title VII or Equal Pay Act
436
discharge.
constructive
or
action
and did not suffer any retaliatory
For the inaugural season of the University of Minnesota's women's hockey
team, the university advertised for two assistant coaches and used the same job
description for both jobs. 4 37 Although the job title and description for both
jobs was the same, so-called "first assistant" Elizabeth Witchger made $11,000
more and had an additional one month of employment on her contract than so-

429. 364 F.3d 753 (6th Cir. 2004).
430. Id. at 763.
431. Id. at 756.
432. Id. at 756-57.
433. Id. at 757.
434. Id. at 758-61.
435. 362 F.3d 1042 (8th Cir. 2004).
436. Id. at 1044.
437. Id.
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called "second assistant" David Horn. 438 Additionally, while Witchger and
Horn had some similar duties, Witchger and Horn also had some distinct
duties. 439 Although Horn knew he accepted the position of "second assistant,"
he did not realize the difference in salaries and length of employment until the.
next season. 440 When Horn realized the difference, he complained to the
athletic department and soon after left his position. 44 1 Eventually, Horn
brought suit and claimed wage discrimination, retaliation, and constructive
discharge in violation of Title VII and the Equal Pay Act. 442 For the wage
discrimination claim, the court found that Horn had not met his burden
because his and Witcheger's jobs were not substantially equal in that
Witcheger handled more of the recruiting and public relations duties while
Horn was more involved in behind-the-scenes work. 443 The court concluded
that Horn had not suffered any adverse employment action because his terms
of employment did not change and the University offered him a contract with
extended terms and salary and therefore dismissed the retaliation claim. 444
Finally, the court found that Horn could not succeed on his constructive
discharge claim because the head coach's documentation of alleged
performance problems and alleged unprofessional treatment of Horn in front
of the players were not intolerable working conditions. 445
Harrisv. City of Montgomery
In Harris v. City of Montgomery,446 the Middle District of Alabama
denied a city's summary judgment motion and found that a reasonable jury
could believe that the city had discriminated against an employee due to his
447
military status.
Gregory Harris, a city recreational employee, coached the junior high
football team. 44 8 In 2002, he was called for an annual military leave, and
when he showed his supervisors his orders, they demoted him from head

438.
439.
440.
441.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 1044.
Id.

442. Id.
443. Id. at 1045-46.
444. Id. at 1046.
445. Id. at 1047.
446. 322 F. Supp. 2d 1319 (M.D. Ala. 2004).
447. Id. at 1325-29.
448. Id. at 1321.
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football coach to an assistant.44 9 While on military leave, the city docked
4 50
Harris for vacation time and did not give him paid military leave.
Additionally, Harris alleged that he was denied a merit raise due to his military
duties. 45 1 Harris brought an action against the city and his supervisors and
alleged violations of the Uniform Services Employment and Reemployment
4 52
Rights Act (USERRA) and the Fifth, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments.
For the USERRA claim, the court concluded that a reasonable jury could find
4 53 The
that the city discriminated against Harris because of his military status.
court found that the constitutional claims were without merit since Harris was
not a federal employee and the Fourteenth Amendment claim was identical to
the USERRA claim. 454 Therefore, the court denied the city's motion for
455
summary judgment.
Cowan v. Unified School District501
In Cowan v. Unified School District 501,456 the District Court of Kansas
denied five racial discrimination claims by a coaching applicant, but found a
based on the school's
triable issue of fact as to the plaintiffs sixth claim
457
interview.
job
a
him
denying
for
inconsistent reasons
The plaintiff, an African-American, applied for six different coaching
4 58 When he did not
positions at Kansas public high schools within three years.
obtain any of jobs, he sued the school district claiming violations of Title VII,
459 Using the
the Kansas Act Against Discrimination, and section 1981.
McDonnell-Douglas burden-shifting analysis, the court examined the reasons
why the plaintiff was not hired. 4 60 Dismissing one claim due to the statute of
limitations, 4 6 1 the court granted summary judgment to four of the plaintiffs
claims because the hired applicants had superior or similar records of

449. Id.
450.
451.
452.
453.
454.
455.

Id. at
Id.
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id.

1322.
1321.
1325-28.
1329.

456. 316 F. Supp. 2d 1061 (D. Kan. 2004).
457. Id. at 1071.
458. Id. at 1064-65.
459. Id. at 1063.
460. Id. at 1067-71.
461. Id. at 1068.
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experience and accomplishments as the plaintiff.4 62

However, the court

denied summary judgment on the plaintiffs last claim because of the school's
inconsistent reasons for denying the plaintiff the chance to interview first
claiming the reason as experience-based, then as related to experience of the
school's program.4 63 Thus, only one of the
applicant within the particular 464
plaintiffs six claims proceeded.
Lee v. United States Taekwondo Union
In Lee v. United States Taekwondo Union,465 the District Court of Hawaii
tae kwon do
denied injunctive relief to the former coach of the U.S. national
466
reasons.
racial
for
him
fired
USOC
team who claimed the
In 2003, based on the recommendation of the United States Taekwondo
Union (USTU), the United States Olympic Committee (USOC) chose Dae
4 67
Sung Lee to be the tae kwon do coach for the 2004 Olympic Games.
However, at the same time, the USTU was experiencing financial and
managerial difficulties, and the USOC revoked its membership. 46 8 Soonafter,
the USOC terminated Lee as head coach, citing the reason that the team had
fewer credentials and wanted to give the credentials to the athletes' personal
coaches to better the team's medal hopes. 469 Based on comments the USOC
made about Korea, Lee brought suit and alleged that he was terminated
because he was Korean. 470 For relief, Lee asked for an injunction and
reinstatement as coach. 47 1 After dismissing some of Lee's claims because they
were precluded under the Amateur Sports Act,4 72 the court determined that the
Amateur Sports Act did not preclude Lee's section 1981 claim. 4 73 Using the
McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting analysis, the court examined the reasons
behind Lee's dismissal. 474 Finding that the USOC's reasons were legitimate
and non-discriminatory, the court shifted the burden back to Lee to
462.
463.
464.
465.
466.
467.

Id. at 1068-70.
Id. at 1070-71.
Id. at 1071.
331 F. Supp. 2d 1252 (D. Haw. 2004).
Id. at 1269.
Id. at 1263.

468. Id. at 1263-64.
469. Id. at 1264.
470. Id. at 1254, 1266.
471. Id. at 1261.
472. Id. at 1255-59.
473. Id. at 1260.
474. Id. at 1268.
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demonstrate pretext. 47 5 As Lee alleged no evidence of pretext, the court denied
476
Lee's claim for injunctive relief.
HIGH SCHOOL LEGAL ISSUES

High school sports participation involves a number of issues that are
addressed in other areas of law. However, the restraints placed on high school
athletes and programs differ significantly from the restrictions on collegiate
athletes and programs. The cases that follow examine these restrictions. An
issue that has recently received more exposure, the treatment of learning
disabled athletes, is also addressed.
Ingram v. Toledo City School DistrictBoard of Education
In Ingram v. Toledo City School DistrictBoard of Education,4 77 an Ohio
federal court enjoined a high school athletic association from preventing a
learning disabled student from playing football due to a failing grade. 478
High school football player David Ingram was learning disabled and
received a tutor's assistance and other help for his classes. 479 Under the Ohio
High School Athletic Association (OHSAA) rules, Ingram needed to pass five
core classes to be eligible for football. 4 80 However, Ingram failed English
due, in part, because he was not provided with testing accommodations he
should have received for his learning disability. 48 1 Because he failed the
exam, he was barred from playing football. 4 82 Although the school allowed
Ingram to retake the English class and obtain a passing grade, the OHSAA
refused to allow Ingram to play because it did not allow students to make up
coursework. 4 83 Ingram filed a request for an injunction to allow him to play
football and to prevent OSHAA from sanctioning his school. 4 84 Because the
school was at fault for not properly accommodating Ingram, the court
determined that OSHAA's refusal to waive its rule was unreasonable. 485 The

475. Id. at 1269.
476. Id.
477. 339 F. Supp. 2d 998 (N.D. Ohio 2004).
478. Id. at 1007.
479. Id. at 1000-01.

480. Id. at 1000.
481. Id. at 100L
.
482. Id.
483. Id. at 1003.
484. Id.
485. Id. at 1004-05.
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court also found that Ingram would suffer irreparable injury due to his chances
486
of obtaining a scholarship being lessened by not playing football.
Moreover, the court found that a waiver would not substantially harm the
OHSAA or any of its schools and that public policy would support granting
4 87
Ingram a waiver.
Breighner v. Michigan High School Athletic Ass'n
In Breighner v. Michigan High School Athletic Ass'n,488 the Supreme
Court of Michigan determined that the Michigan High School Athletic
Association (MHSAA) was not a "public body" under the Freedom of
489
Information Act.

The MHSAA prohibited a high school skier from competing in a ski meet
due to his previous violations of MHSAA rules. 4 90 Under the Freedom of
Information Act, the skier's parents requested information regarding
MHSAA's decision. 49 1 MHSAA rejected the request, stating that it was not a
public body. 492 Subsequently, the parents brought suit to compel the MHSAA
to answer the request. 4 93 To determine whether MHSAA was a public body,

the court examined its make-up. 494 The court found that the MHSAA was an
independent, non-profit corporation that was primarily funded by ticket
revenue from athletic events. 4 95 Additionally, the court noted that schools
paid no dues to MHSAA, the state provided no resources to MHSAA, and
membership with the MHSAA was voluntary. 496 For these reasons, the court
determined that MHSAA was not a public body and, thus, did not need to
49 7
disclose the information.
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY

Intellectual property law continues to affect the sports market in a number

486. Id. at 1006.
487.
488.
489.
490.
491.
492.

Id. at 1006-07.
683 N.W.2d 639 (Mich. 2004).
Id. at 648.
Id. at 642.
Id.
Id.

493. Id.
494. Id. at 644.
495. Id. at 645.
496. Id. at 645-47.
497. Id. at 648.
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of ways. Trademark protection, patent protection, athletes' right to privacy
and cybersquatting are only a few of the areas that courts addressed with
regard to the intersection of sports and intellectual property law in the past
year. The cases below discuss this intersection and its impact on both the
development of intellectual property law and sports.
Nike, Inc. v. Circle Group Internet,Inc.
In Nike, Inc. v. Circle Group Internet, Inc.,4 98 the Northern District of
Illinois found that the owner of a internet domain name, which was similar to
Nike's trademark "just do it," violated the Anticybersquatting Consumer
Protection Act and found that a material issue of fact existed as to Nike's claim
4 99
that the internet domain name diluted the "just do it" trademark.
Since 1997, Circle Group Internet owned the intemet domain name
500
"justdoit.net" and used that site to redirect visitors to its home page.
Owning the trademark "just do it," Nike brought suit against Circle Group and
alleged that the Circle Group's use of the domain name was cybersquatting, a
violation of the Lanham Act, and a violation of Illinois common law. 50 1 The
court granted summary judgment to Nike on the cybersquatting claim because
Nike established that its trademark was distinctive and famous, Circle Group's
domain name was identical or confusingly similar to the Nike trademark, and
Circle Group had registered the domain name in bad faith. 50 2 The court found
bad faith in that Circle Group's owner had no connection with "just do it" and
had no reasonable grounds to believe that he could fairly and lawfully use the
phrase. 50 3 In contrast, the court denied summary judgment on the issue of
dilution because a material fact existed as to whether Circle Group was
diluting Nike's trademark and further information was required for a
50 4
determination by the trier of fact.
Playmakers L.L.C., v. ESPN, Inc.
In Playmakers L.L.C., v. ESPN, Inc.,50 5 the Ninth Circuit denied
Playmakers' preliminary injunction motion against ESPN for using

498. 318 F. Supp. 2d 688 (N.D. I11.
2004).
499. Id. at 695.
500. Id. at 689.
501. Id.

502.
503.
504.
505.

Id. at 691-94.
Id. at 691-92.
Id. at 695.
376 F.3d 894 (9th Cir. 2004).
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50 6
"Playmakers" as the name of a television series.
Playmakers, L.L.C. (the "Agency") brought this suit at the beginning of
the first season of the television program "Playmakers" (the "Program") to
prevent ESPN from using the title for a second season, selling it to another
network, or releasing videos or DVDs under that name. 50 7 The Agency, which
had two trademarks for its name, argued that ESPN's use of the name would
devalue its trademark and goodwill of its business because professional or
aspiring professional football players would associate the name with the
controversial television show or believe that the Agency was infringing on the
5 °8
Program's mark to take advantage of ESPN.
Applying the "likelihood of confusion" test, the court determined that
people would not be confused because "playmaker" is a common term, there
are differences in marketing, and the degree of care that professional athletes
use in choosing an agent would prevent such a decision from being made
based on incomplete information. 50 9 Thus, the court denied the Agency's
request for a preliminary injunction because the Agency could not show that it
5 10
could succeed on the merits.

KingVision Pay-Per-View, Corp. v. Belmont, Inc.
In KingVision Pay-Per-View, Corp. v. Belmont, Inc.,5 11 the Third Circuit
Court of Appeals determined that the Pennsylvania cable piracy statute was
more analogous to the Federal Communications Act (FCA) and upheld the
5 12
dismissal of the Plaintiffs claim due to the statute of limitations.
On March 13, 1999, the El Toro bar broadcast the pay-per-view boxing
match of Evander Holyfield and Lennox Lewis, as well as other matches,
without the permission of the matches' licensee, KingVision. 5 13 KingVision
sued El Toro for this violation in June 2001. 5 14 However, the court dismissed
KingVision's suit because it was filed after the Pennsylvania cable piracy
statute's two-year limitation. 5 15 KingVision appealed the decision and asked
the court to apply the three-year limitation of the Copyright Act because it
506. Id. at 898.
507. Id. at 896.
508.
509.
510.
511.
512.

Id.
Id. at 897.
Id. at 898.
366 F.3d 217 (3d Cir. 2004).
Id. at 219.

513. Id.
514. Id.
515. Id.
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more closely parallels the FCA.5 16 The court stated that because the FCA did
5 17
not have a time limitation, the court had to look at analogous state statutes.
Agreeing with the district court, the court concluded that the two-year
5 18
limitation applied because the piracy statute was more similar to the FCA.
Moreover, the court found that the two-year time limitation did not "frustrate
the practicalities of litigation" because KingVision knew about the violation
520
for two years. 519 Accordingly, the court upheld the dismissal.
Weinstein Design Group, Inc. v. Fielder
In Weinstein Design Group, Inc. v. Fielder,52 1 a Florida appellate court
determined that the propriety of a design company's use of a professional
baseball player's name in a magazine and undistributed brochures was a
522
question for a jury.
Weinstein Design Group (Weinstein) contracted with former professional
baseball player Cecil Fielder and his wife Stacy Fielder to decorate their
home. 523 Later, Fielder filed suit and alleged that Weinstein misused his name
for commercial purposes. 524 Because Weinstein stipulated that he used
Fielder's name without consent, the only issues at trial were whether a
magazine article and undistributed brochures were an exception to liability, the
amount of any compensatory damages, and the amount of any punitive
damages. 525 The court found that the trial court properly submitted the issue
of the magazine and brochure use to the jury for. consideration because neither
publication was exempt from liability under the state statute as a matter of
law. 526 As for damages, the court found that the jury's award of compensatory
damages was supported by evidence; in contrast, the court determined that
52 7
Weinstein's level of culpability did not meet the level for punitive damages.
Thus, the court affirmed the trial court's ruling on these motions, except for

516. Id.
517. Id. at 220.
518. Id. at 225.
519. Id.
520.
521.
522.
523.
524.

Id.
884 So. 2d 990 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004).
Id. at 997-99.
Id. at 993.
Id.

525. Id. at 993-94.
526. Id. at 997-99.
527. Id. at 999-1003.
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punitive damages.

579

528

Callaway Golf Co. v. Dunlop Slazenger Group Americas, Inc.
In Callaway Golf Co. v. Dunlop Slazenger Group Americas, Inc.,529 the
District Court of Delaware concluded that Callaway had not misappropriated
Dunlop's trade secrets of its polyurethane golf ball when a former Dunlop
530
employee designed a polyurethane golf ball for Callaway.
Through one of its inventors, Pijush Dewanjee, Dunlop had created threepiece, cast polyurethane-covered golf balls in 1996 and was in the process of
developing new polyurethane blends to better improve the manufacturing
In February 1997, based on Duwanjee's
process during 1997.531
experimentation and notes, Dunlop filed for a patent for this new polyurethane
blend, and Duwanjee signed a confidentiality agreement that stated any
information related to the polyurethane golf ball, or any information received
from Dunlop's vendors to design or develop products, was Dunlop's
However, in June 1997,
confidential and proprietary information. 532
Duwanjee resigned from Dunlop and began working on developing a golf ball
for rival Callaway. 533 Shortly thereafter, Duwanjee received a patent for a
polyurethane-blend golf ball that used the same polymer as his design at
Dunlop. 534 Once the golf ball reached the market, Dunlop filed suit and
claimed Callaway violated the California Trade Secrets Act. 535 Because
Dunlop failed to show that it experimented with the polymer before Duwanjee
left, the polymer had been mentioned in other previous patents, and Callaway
submitted evidence that it discovered the polymer independently, the court
held that Dunlop had not established a trade secret. 5 36 Additionally, the court
found that in regard to Duwanjee's February 1997 patent application and notes,
although the contents may have been Dunlop's trade secrets, insufficient
evidence existed that Callaway misappropriated them because Callaway's golf
ball's ingredients were in the public domain and were not substantially similar
to Dunlop's. 537 Thus, the court granted partial summary judgment to Callaway
528.
529.
530.
531.
532.

Id. at 1003.

533.
534.
535.
536.

Id.

318 F. Supp. 2d 205 (D. Del. 2004).
Id. at 216.
Id. at 207-08.
Id. at 208.
Id. at 209.
Id.
Id. at211-12.

537. Id. at213-15.
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on the misappropriation of trade secrets claims. 538

MISCELLANEOUS LEGAL ISSUES

This category is meant to include those cases that do not fall within one of
the delineated categories involved in this survey. These cases involved state
open meetings laws, the Americans with Disabilities Act, standing, and duty
rates.
Hartz Mountain Industries,Inc. v. New Jersey Sports & Exposition Authority
In Hartz Mountain Industries, Inc. v. New Jersey Sports & Exposition
Authority,539 a New Jersey appellate court determined that a state authority
had not violated the open meetings law or deviated from the proper bidding
process and hearing, but remanded the open records claim for an in-camera
540
review.
The New Jersey Sports & Exposition Authority (NJSEA) was accepting
bids to build a multi-use development near the Continental Arena known as
the "Meadowlands Xanadu."5 4 1 After the NJSEA decided to accept the Mills
Corporation and Mack-Cali Reality Corporation bid, one of the unsuccessful
bidders, Hartz Mountain Industries, brought suit alleging violations of the
Open Public Records Act, the Open Meetings Act, the bidding procedure, and
protest hearing. 54 2 Hartz requested documents from the NJSEA regarding the
543
public bidding process, however, the NJSEA denied most of these requests.
The court determined that a lower court needed to conduct an in-camera
review of the requested documents to determine whether the NJSEA's denial
was proper. 544 Hartz argued that the NJSEA's holding of a closed meeting
violated the state open meetings statute. 54 5 Because the meeting was about
contract negotiation issues and real estate disposition, the court determined
that NJSEA's closed session was lawful. 546 Lastly, Hartz asserted that it was

538. Id at216.
539. 848 A.2d 793 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2004).

540. Id.at 803.
541. Id.at 795.
542. Id.
543. Id.
544. Id.at 798-99.

545. Id.at 799.
546. Id.at 800.
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entitled to a contested case hearing in front of an administrative law judge. 54 7
Rejecting this argument, the court stated that such a hearing was not required,
especially because the NJSEA could choose the winning bidder based on
several factors, not just price.548 Thus, the court remanded Hartz's open
records claim but denied Hartz's open meetings and contested hearing
549
claims.
DisabledRights Action Committee v. Las Vegas Events, Inc.
In Disabled Rights Action Committee v. Las Vegas Events, Inc., 55 the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reinstated a disabled advocates group's
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) claim against a rodeo for
discrimination in seating, ticket prices, and accommodations. 55 1
The Disabled Rights Action Committee (DRAC), a group of advocates for
disabled people, brought suit against Las Vegas Events (Events) alleging that
the company violated the ADA by discriminating against disabled patrons'
with regard to access, seating arrangements, and ticket prices at rodeos. 552
DRAC sought an injunction that would prevent Events from holding rodeos
until these disparities were addressed. 5 53 At issue in this appeal was whether
Title III of the ADA applied to private entities operating facilities owned by
public entities, and if so, the circumstances of that application. 554 Also at
issue was whether the University and Community College System of Nevada
(University System), the owner of the arena, needed to be joined to the
action. 555 After examining the applicable statutes, regulations, and cases, the
court determined that whether Title III applied to Events depended on whether
Events exercised enough control over the arena as to be the "operator" of the
arena. 55 6 Accordingly, the court allowed DRAC to develop a factual basis to
that claim. 557 In deciding the other issue, the court held that the University
System was not a necessary party under Rule 19 of the Federal Rules of Civil

547.
548.
549.
550.

Id.
Id. at 800-01.
Id. at 803.
375 F.3d 861 (9th Cir. 2004).
551. Id. at 884.
552. Id. at 865-67.
553. Id. at 867.
554. Id. at 872.
555. Id. at 878.
556. Id.
557. Id.
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Procedure. 55 8 Thus, the court reversed the district court's dismissal of the
action against Events and did not require joinder of the University System as a
559
party.
Bauer Nike Hockey USA, Inc. v. United States
In Bauer Nike Hockey USA, Inc. v. United States,560 the Federal Circuit
hockey pants were to be considered ice hockey equipment
determined that ice
56 1
importation.
for
Bauer makes hockey pants that are imported into the United States. 562 In
this suit, at issue was whether the United States should have classified the
pants as garments with a sixteen percent duty rate or ice hockey equipment,
which was duty-free. 56 3 Concluding that the pants fell under the more specific
description of ice hockey equipment, the court concluded that the pants should
be reclassified. 564 Thus, the pants were not subject to the sixteen percent duty
565
rate.
TAx
Every American faces taxation issues and sports figures and organizations
are no different. Because many sports organizations are non-profit entities,
there are often tax challenges brought with regard to charity status and tax
exemption. The following cases involve a charitable designation as well as the
proper treatment of a personal seat license with respect to corporate tax
treatment of dividends.
Quad Cities Open, Inc. v. City of Silvis
In Quad Cities Open, Inc. v. City of Silvis, 566 the Illinois supreme court
held that a charity golf tournament was567not operated "for private gain," and
thus, was not subject to a municipal tax.

558. Id. at 883.
559. Id. at 884.
560. 393 F.3d 1246 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
561. Id. at 1252-53.
562. Id. at 1248.
563. Id.
564. Id. at 1252-53.
565. Id.at 1253.
566. 804 N.E.2d 499 (I11.2004).
567. Id. at510.
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The city of Silvis, Illinois, enacted an ordinance that imposed a three
percent tax upon gross receipts from admission ticket sales issued for
professional tournaments or other professional athletic events held "for
gain." 5 68 At issue was whether the city could tax the Quad Cities Open, a
charitable golf tournament sanctioned by the Professional Golfers' Association
(PGA). 56 9 Because the term "for gain" was ambiguous, the court concluded
that the legislature did not intend to tax "events organized and operated for
charitable purposes." 570 Furthermore, even though some of the profits were
used for operating expenses and tournament purses, the court found that the
Quad Cities Open was not held for private profit or gain and that the
tournament donated several million dollars for charities. 57 1 Accordingly, the
court concluded that the Quad Cities Open was operated for charitable
purposes, and the city could not impose its tax.5 72
IndianapolisOsteopathicHospital,Inc. v. Department ofLocal Government
Finance
In Indianapolis Osteopathic Hospital, Inc. v. Department of Local
Government Finance,573 the Tax Court of Indiana determined that a sports
club was not entitled to a charitable tax exemption. 574
The Health Institute of Indiana operated a sports club and medical pavilion
on the grounds of Westview Hospital. 575 Consisting of seventy-four percent
of the property, the sports club contained tennis courts, racquetball courts,
pools, a track, aerobics rooms, fitness equipment, and other amenities. 576
Among other things, at issue was whether the sports club qualified for a
charitable purposes tax exemption. 577 Because the sports club generated
revenue and competed with other sports clubs, the court determined that the
club did not qualify for the charitable tax exemption. 578 Thus, the court
denied the Health Institute's petition. 579
568. Id. at 502.
569. Id. at 501.
570. Id. at 506.
571. Id. at 510.
572. Id.
573. 818 N.E.2d 1009 (Ind. T.C. 2004).
574. Id. at 1018.
575. Id. at 1011.
576. Id. at 1012.
577. Id. at 1013.
578. Id. at 1018.
579. Id.
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Kerns v. Commissioner
In Kerns v. Commissioner,580 the United States Tax Court concluded that
a permanent seat license was a constructive
a company's payment to purchase
58 1
dividend to its shareholders.
The petitioners, who owned one hundred percent of the stock of
InsurMark, Inc., bought a permanent seat license for Houston Texans football
games in 1999 with InsurMark funds, but did not deduct the amount on their
corporate income tax return. 582 In the agreement to purchase the seat license,
the petitioner indicated that the license was for personal use. 5 83 However, the
petitioners did not include the amount paid for the personal seat license as
constructive dividend income on their federal tax returns. 584 Because the
shareholders benefited economically by obtaining the permanent seat license
without any cost to themselves and the license was held in their name, not the
payment for the seat
company's, the court concluded that the company's
585
petitioners.
the
to
license was a constructive dividend
TICKET HOLDER ISSUES
The area of ticket holders' rights has become an area of much litigation
recently. While past litigation has often involved challenges by ticket holders
against the teams on the issue of right of revocation, current litigation involves
other ticket-related issues. For example, individual ticket holders have faced
challenges regarding their property rights in ownership of season tickets and
ticket holders have contested the team's right to place their seating within
certain areas of the stadium. The cases that follow discuss two of the ticket
holder challenges that have occurred in the last year.
Lipton v. Donnenfeld
In Lipton v. Donnenfeld,586 a New York appeals court ruled that a season
ticket owner who bought tickets for his friends held the tickets in a
constructive trust and had to transfer the license to purchase two of the tickets

580. 87 T.C.M. (CCH) 1082 (2004).
581. Id. at 1083.
582. Id.
583. Id.
584. Id.
585. Id.
586. 5 A.D.3d 356 (N.Y. App. Div. 2004).
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to his friend due to his friend's status as beneficiary. 587
For over thirty years, under one account, Saul Lipton purchased eight
season tickets to New York Jets games for himself and his friends, including
Lawrence Brand and Norman Donnenfeld. 588 In 1995, Lipton transferred the
season ticket account to Donnenfeld. 5 89 However, two years later, Lipton and
Brand requested that Donnenfeld transfer the tickets into their names, but he
refused. 590 At trial, Brand won a constructive trust for his two tickets, and
Donnenfeld appealed. 5 9 1 The court found that the agreement between the
friends was that each was the owner of his two tickets, and Lipton maintained
only nominal title to the license to buy the tickets. 5 92 When Lipton transferred
the tickets to Donnenfeld's name, Lipton transferred the interest as a
constructive trustee. 593 Thus, because Brand was a beneficiary of the
constructive trust, the court determined that Brand was the owner of the
tickets, and Donnenfeld would be unjustly enriched if he were to keep the
tickets as his own. 594 The appellate court affirmed the trial court's decision
allocating actual ownership of the tickets to Brand. 5 95
Yocca v. PittsburghSteelers Sports, Inc.
In Yocca v. Pittsburgh Steelers Sports, Inc.,596 the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania dismissed a breach of contract claim and other claims made by
fans that were unhappy with their seat locations in the new stadium. 597
To encourage fans to buy seats in their new stadium, the Pittsburgh
Steelers sent a brochure to season ticketholders for "stadium builder
licenses." 5 98 Among other information, the brochure provided a diagram of the
seating locations in the new stadium. 599 Once subscribers notified the Steelers
that they were interested in the licenses, the subscribers needed to sign a

587. Id. at 357-58.
588. Id.at 357.
589. Id.
590. Id.
591. Id.
592. Id. at 358.
593. Id.
594. Id.
595. Id.
596. 854 A.2d 425 (Pa. 2004).
597. Id. at 439.
598. Id.at 427.
599. Id. at 428-29.
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contract. 60 0 When the stadium was completed, the Steelers notified the season
ticketholders of their seat locations. 60 1 The plaintiffs brought suit after they
were dissatisfied with the location of their seats, specifically, that their seats
were not within the twenty-yard line and ,were in the sixteenth row of the
upper deck.60 2 They claimed that the Steelers had breached the contract
because the seats were not in the same location as the original brochure had
represented and alleged that through fraud and negligent misrepresentation,
the Steelers violated the Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law
603
(UTPCPL).
Reversing the lower appellate court, the supreme court found that the
brochure was not part of the agreement between the parties because the
subsequent contract Was unambiguous, detailed the terms and conditions of the
the sale. 60 4
sale, and stated that it represented the entire contract concerning
Accordingly, the court dismissed the breach of contract claim. Similarly, the
court dismissed the UTPCPL because the plaintiffs' reliance on the brochure
60 6
60 5 Therefore, the plaintiffs' claims were dismissed.
was not justifiable.
TORT LAW ISSUES

The most frequently litigated area of sports law in 2004 was tort law.
Sports present a challenge in the application of tort law at times because of the
contact and intensity involved in a number of sports. In the following cases,
courts considered cases a number of torts issues between participants and
The courts also addressed the
leagues and between co-participants.
to entities that may otherwise be
statutes
application of recreational immunity
liable for negligence.
Kreil v. County of Niagara
In Kreil v. County of Niagara,60 7 a New York appellate court found that a
throw competition assumed the risk of being struck and
spectator at a hammer
60 8
dismissed her claim.

600.
601.
602.
603.

Id. at 431.
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Id.
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604. Id. at 437-38.
605. Id. at 439.
606. Id.
607. 778 N.Y.S.2d 601 (App. Div. 2004).
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At the Scottish Highland Games, during the hammer throw competition, a
thrown hammer struck and injured a spectator. 60 9 The spectator sued the
county for negligence to recover for her injuries. 6 10 The court concluded that
being struck is an inherent risk of watching a hammer throw competition and
that the spectator assumed the risk of being struck. 6 11 Accordingly, the court
granted summary judgment to the county and dismissed the spectator's
6 12
claim.
Peart v. Ferro
In Peart v. Ferro,6 13 the Court of Appeals of California determined that
operating a Sea-Doo watercraft constituted a sport, and thus, found that the
doctrine of primary of assumption of risk could be used as a defense. 6 14
At issue in this case was whether using a Sea-Doo watercraft constituted a
sport with regard to the principle of primary assumption of risk.6 15 The
plaintiff, Peart, suffered injuries after his friend's Sea-Doo collided with his
Sea-Doo while they were operating the watercraft recreationally. 6 16
Subsequently, Peart filed suit and alleged that the other Sea-Doo operator was
negligent. 6 17 Relying on an earlier decision in which the court determined that
primary assumption of risk applied to jet skiing, the court concluded that
primary assumption of risk applied to using a Sea-Doo because it was fairly
similar to a jet ski. 6 18 Thus, the defendant could assert primary assumption of
6 19
risk as a defense to the negligence.
Higgins v. Intex Recreation Corp.
In Higgins v. Intex Recreation Corp.,620 the Court of Appeals of
Washington upheld a jury verdict that rendered a snow tube manufacturer

609. Id.
610. Id.
611. Id.
612. Id.
613. 13 Cal. Rptr. 3d 885 (Ct. App. 2004).
614. Id. at 899.
615.
616.
617.
618.
619.
620.

Id. at 888.
Id. at 889-90.
Id. at 890.
Id. at 895-96.
Id. at 903.
99 P.3d 421 (Wash. Ct. App. 2004).
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62 1
strictly liable for its snow tube's unsafe design.
While snow tubing, Dan Falkner collided with a seven-year-old boy and
Tom Higgins, who was trying to move the boy out of Falkner's path. 622 As a
result of the collision, Higgins's spinal cord was severed and he was rendered
a quadriplegic. 623 Among others, Higgins sued Intex Recreation Corporation
(Intex), the company that manufactured the snow tube, in a products liability
claim; at trial, a jury found that the snow tube was not reasonably safely
624
designed and held Intex strictly liable for thirty-five percent of the damages.
On appeal, using the risk-utility test and the consumer expectation test, the
court determined that an alternative, safer design existed, thereby supporting

the jury's verdict. 625

As for Higgins's assumption of the risk, the court

concluded that no other reasonable safe option for rescue existed and that the
trial court was correct in determining as a matter of law that Higgins had not
assumed the risk of his injuries. 626 Therefore, the court upheld the jury's
627
verdict in favor of the plaintiff.

Bunch v. Hoffinger Industries,Inc.
In Bunch v. Hoffinger Industries, Inc.,628 a California appellate court
upheld a twelve million dollar recovery to an eleven-year-old girl who was
629
injured from diving into a pool.

Eleven-year-old Leesa Bunch became a quadriplegic after diving into a
four-foot-deep aboveground swimming pool. 630

Among others, she sued

Hoffinger Industries, Inc. (Hoffinger), the manufacturer of the pool liner, for
A
negligence, products liability, failure to warn, and breach of warranty. 631 632
appealed.
Hoffinger
and
damages,
in
million
$12
jury awarded her
Hoffinger's first issue of appeal concerned whether diving headfirst into an
open pool constituted an open and obvious danger. 633 Examining numerous
621.

Id. at 431.

622. Id. at 423.
623. Id.
624. Id.at 423-24.
625.
626.
627.
628.

Id.at 425-26.
Id.at 427-28.
Id.at 431.
20 Cal. Rptr. 3d 780 (Ct. App. 2004).

629. Id. at 783.
630. Id.
631. Id.
632. Id.
633. Id.at 789.
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cases concerning the adequacies of warnings, the court determined that as a
matter of law, an eleven-year-old could not appreciate the danger of diving
into a shallow aboveground pool. 634 The court also found that assumption of
the risk was unavailable for Hoffinger because the defense did not apply to a
product liabilities claim. 635 Finally, the court found that evidence existed that
the lack of adequate warnings on the pool liner was a substantial factor in
637
causing Bunch's injuries. 636 Thus, the court upheld the jury's decision.
Unzen v. City of Duluth
In Unzen v. City of Duluth,638 the Court of Appeals of Minnesota
concluded that a city and its independent contractor were not immune from a
personal injury lawsuit that arose from a patron falling down a staircase in a
6 39
municipal golf course clubhouse.
At a municipal golf course clubhouse, Robert Unzen tripped over some
metal "nosing" on a flight of stairs and fell down. 640 To recover for his
injuries, he sued the city and an independent contractor the city hired to
maintain the clubhouse for negligence. 641 Both defendants asserted that they
were immune under Minnesota's recreational-use statute. 642 Analyzing the
statute, the court determined that because the clubhouse was used to provide
tickets, lockers, and rental equipment, it was afforded recreational use
immunity. 643 However, the court determined that the city was not immune
under the trespass exception to the statute because the condition of the stairs
could not be readily seen and could cause death or great bodily harm. 64 4
Furthermore, the court concluded that the city was not entitled to discretionary
immunity because failing to warn about the previously known danger was an
"operational-level" decision, not a discretionary decision. 645 Finally, the
independent contractor was not immune as an agent of the city because of his
almost complete control over the clubhouse and golf course and his use of his
634. Id.at 796.
635. Id.at 797-98.
636. Id. at 798-800.
637. Id. at 800.
638. 683 N.W.2d 875 (Minn. Ct. App. 2004).
639. Id. at 883.
640. Id. at 877.
641. Id. at 878.
642. Id.

643. Id.
at 879.
644. Id.
at 881.
645. Id. at 882-83.
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own inventory.6 4 6 Thus, both the city and the independent contractor were
647
subject to liability proceedings.
Geiersbach v. Frieje
In Geiersbach v. Frieje,64 8 the Indiana appellate court, upholding the grant
proper
of summary judgment to the defendants, 649 concluded that in sports, the 650
standard of care was recklessness or maliciousness or intentional injury.
Tri-State University baseball player William Geiersbach suffered severe
and permanent damage to his eye when he was hit by an errant throw during a
baseball drill. 65 1 In his lawsuit, he alleged that the university, coach, volunteer
coach, and Frieje, the teammate who threw the ball, were negligent and
breached their duties of care. 6 52 Although Geiersbach argued that a reasonable
care standard should apply, the court decided that the proper standard of care
was recklessness or maliciousness or intentional injury because sports were
inherently dangerous in nature. 6 53 Moreover, the court extended this standard
of care to all participants in the sporting event. 654 Because Geiersbach did not
allege that Frieje acted recklessly, maliciously, or intentionally, the court
upheld his summary judgment motion. 6 55 With regard to the coaches, the
court determined that because the drill was commonly used in baseball and
players were commonly hit by baseballs, the coaches did not act recklessly and
upheld their summary judgment motions. 656 In regard to the university, the
court upheld the summary judgment motion because Geiersbach made no
657
direct claim against the university.
Davin v. Athletic Club
In Davin v. Athletic Club,6 58 the Court of Appeals of Kansas determined

646. Id. at 882.
647.
648.
649.
650.
651.

Id. at 883.
807 N.E.2d 114 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004).
Id. at 122.
Id.
Id. at 116.

652. Id.
653. Id. at 118.
654. Id. at 120.
655. Id. at 121.
656. Id. at 121-22.
657. Id. at 122.
658. 96 P.3d 687 (Kan. Ct. App. 2004).
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and negligence, was not
that a plaintiff, who had been accused of battery
659
company.
insurance
his
from
$300,000
to
entitled
While playing basketball at the Athletic Club of Overland Park, Michael
Davin was injured when his opponent, Sean Lance, picked him up and
dropped him headfirst onto the floor.660 For his medical bills and lost wages,
Davin sued Lance for battery and negligence. 66 1 Because State Farm insured
Lance under a homeowner's policy, State Farm hired an attorney to represent
Lance under its reservation of rights. 662 Against the attorney's advice, Lance
agreed with Davin to waive a jury trial and allow Davin to take judgment
To obtain the money, Davin brought a
against him for $300,000.663
garnishment action against State Farm for $300,000 - the limit of Lance's
policy.6 64 The trial court granted summary judgment to State Farm, and Davin
appealed. 665 The court found that because State Farm represented Lance
under reservation of its rights, the court was correct in allowing State Farm to
relitigate the merits of the case. 666 Similarly, the court found that collateral
estoppel did not apply because State Farm had no interest in the case when
Lance settled with Davin. 667 Finally, the court determined that the
garnishment trial court's ruling that Lance acted intentionally and not within
the scope of the policy was supported by the evidence. 66 8 Thus, the court
6 69
affirmed the dismissal of Davin's garnishment action.
Reeves v. Middletown Athletic Ass'
In Reeves v. Middletown Athletic Ass'n, 670 the Superior Court of
a
Pennsylvania determined that a material issue of fact existed as to67whether
1
pitching coach negligently taught his pupil an illegal pitching style.
Twelve-year-old Cheryl Reeves played for a club softball team and took

659. Id. at 690-92.
660. Id. at 689.
661. Id.
662. Id.
663. Id.
664.
665.
666.
667.
668.
669.
670.
671.

Id.
Id. at 690.
Id.
Id. at 691.
Id. at 691-92.
Id. at 692.
866 A.2d 115 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2004).
Id. at 1131.
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private pitching lessons from her coach. 6 72 During mid-season, the coach
dismissed Reeves from the team for disruptive behavior during a
tournament. 673 Reeves sued the coach and league alleging that both had
breached a contract by teaching -her an illegal, pitching style and were
negligent concerning her dismissal from the team. 674 On the breach of
contract claim, the court concluded that Reeves's claim failed because she had
not presented any evidence that she was a third-party beneficiary of an oral
contract between her parents and the Middletown Athletic Association
(MAA). 67 5 In contrast, the court determined that a material issue of fact
existed as to whether the coach and MAA negligently taught Reeves an illegal
pitching style. 6 76 Thus, the court reversed on summary judgment as to the
negligence and upheld summary judgment for the breach of contract claim. 6 77
Oberson v. United States
In Oberson v. United States,678 a Montana district court determined that
the United States was partially liable for a snowmobiler's injuries. 6 79
While snowmobiling, Brian Musselman suffered severe brain injuries
when one of his companion's snowmobiles flew over a hill and struck him in
the head. 6 80 His guardian brought suit for his injuries under the Federal Tort
Claims Act and alleged that the United States was negligent for "failing to
correct or warn of an allegedly dangerous trail condition on the groomed
snowmobile trail. ' 681 The court first considered whether the United States
was immune from suit. 682 Because the government's failure to warn of the
hazardous hill was not because of public policy concerns or competing policy
considerations, the court found that immunity did not apply to this type of
discretionary decision. 68 3 Next, the court considered assumption of the risk
under the Montana statutes. 6 84 Examining the statute, the court concluded that
672.
673.
674.
675.

Id.at 1118.
Id.
Id. at 1119.
Id. at 1125-26.

676. Id. at ll31.
677. Id.
678. 311 F. Supp. 2d 917 (D.Mont.2004).
679. Id.at 959.
680. Id.at 923.
681. Id.
682. Id. at 952.
683. Id. at 956.
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nothing eliminated the United States' duty to warn of risks of which it was
aware. 685 Apportioning the damage between the parties, 6 86 the court found
for Musselman's
that the United States Forest Service was forty percent liable
688
injuries. 687 Thus, Musselman was able to recover damages.
Patton v. UnitedStates ofAmerica Rugby Football
In Patton v. United States of America Rugby Football,6 89 the Court of
owed no duty
Appeals of Maryland found that a rugby tournament's organizers
690
lightning.
by
struck
were
who
spectator
and
player
to a
In an unusual case, the Patton family sued the U.S.A. Rugby Football
Union, the rugby tournament's organizers, and the referees for negligence after
lightning struck and injured their son, who was playing in the tournament, and
killed the father, who was watching the tournament. 69 1 The injuries occurred
at the conclusion of a game that had been played during heavy rain and
lightning. 692 Finding that the two could have left the tournament at any time if
they felt their lives were in jeopardy, the court concluded that the tournament
organizers owed no duty to protect the father and son. 69 3 Thus, the court
694
affirmed the dismissal of the action.
Stringerv. Minnesota Vikings FootballClub, L.L. C.
In Stringer v. Minnesota Vikings Football Club, L.L.C.,69 5 the Court of
Appeals of Minnesota denied recovery to a professional football player's
widow by concluding that team trainers were not grossly negligent in giving
696
medical treatment to her husband.
Professional football player Korey Stringer died after suffering heat stroke
during football practice. 697 His wife brought a wrongful death suit against
685. Id.
686. The court attributed fifty percent of the damages to one of Musselman's companions and ten
percent to Musselman himself. Id. at 959-60.
687. Id. at 959.
688. Id. at 962.
689. 851 A.2d 566 (Md. 2004).
690.
691.
692.
693.
694.
695.
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696. Id. at 553.
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other Viking employees, including the head trainer, assistant trainer, and
coordinator of medical services. 69 8 The Vikings moved for summary
judgment on the basis that the trainers and medical services coordinator were
Stringer's co-employees and, therefore, immune under the worker's
compensation laws. 6 99 With the trainers having directly cared for Stringer and
not being involved with general workplace safety or the removal of workplace
hazards, the court held that the trainers were not immune and owed a duty to
Stringer. 70 0 In contrast, the court found that the medical services coordinator's
actions were to ensure the Vikings provided a safe workplace and rendered
him immune. 70 1 To recover, the plaintiffs had to show that the trainers were
grossly negligent in their treatment of Stringer. 702 Because the trainers
observed Stringer's condition, treated Stringer, attempted to rehydrate Stringer,
and took him to the hospital, the court concluded that the trainers were not
70 3
grossly negligent and upheld summary judgment against the plaintiff.
Maisonave v. Newark Bears
In Maisonave v. Newark Bears,70 4 a New Jersey appellate court
determined that a duty of care was owed to a baseball game patron who was
70 5
injured by a foul ball when he was purchasing concessions.
While Louis Maisonave was purchasing food at a vendor cart at a Newark
Bears baseball game, a foul ball struck him in the eye. 70 6 Maisonave sued the
Bears and the vending company for negligence. 70 7 Because the defendants
knew that the area was unscreened and that a patron cannot simultaneously
keep an eye on the game and buy concessions, the court found that the risk of
injury was foreseeable and that a duty of care existed. 70 8 To determine
whether the defendants breached that duty, the court remanded the case for
70 9
further proceedings.
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699. Id. at 548.
700. Id. at 550-51.
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Post v. Belmont Country Club, Inc.
7 10 the Appeals Court of
In Post v. Belmont Country Club, Inc.,
Massachusetts upheld an indemnification clause that required a golf club
cart
member's7 1 homeowner's policy to cover any damages from a golf
accident. '
John Post drove a golf cart into a rope that Belmont Country Club and
the
died when an iron pin that was holding the rope in place struck him in
the
head. 7 12 His estate brought a wrongful death suit, and the club settled
claim, subject to indemnification from Post's homeowner's policy, as outlined
7 13 The estate appealed its requirement to indemnify the
in the club handbook.
7 14 Because Post agreed to be a club member, the
club for the club's losses.
including the
court concluded that he accepted all the club's 7obligations,
15 Furthermore, the court
7 16
indemnification clause in the member handbook.
and was not ambiguous.
found that the contract was not adhesive
7 17
was valid.
Therefore, the court determined that the indemnification

Roberts v. Timber Birch-BroadmooreAthletic Ass'n
7 18 the Superior
In Roberts v. Timber Birch-Broadmoore Athletic Ass'n,
as to whether an
Court of New Jersey held that a material issue of fact existed
7 19
immunity.
athletic association was subject to charitable
Timber BirchThe plaintiff attended a soccer tournament that 72the
0
Although she
Broadmoore Athletic Association (TBBAA) hosted.
watching
volunteered as an equipment aide, she spent the majority of her time
72 1 After one of her daughter's games, the
her daughter's and son's teams play.
plaintiff walked to the vendor stand to get something to eat and injured herself
722 The trial court dismissed her
when she tripped and fell over a cooler.
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negligence claim because it was barred under the charitable immunity
statute. 723 On appeal, the court found that the TBBAA was a charitable
institution and was engaged in its stated goals at the time the plaintiff injured
herself.724 Nevertheless, for the TBBAA to be immune, the plaintiff must
have been a beneficiary, and not a contributor to the organization. 725 Here, the
court found that a material issue of fact existed as to whether the plaintiff was
a true volunteer or merely helped out while she was watching her children's
games. 726 Thus, because the issue was disputed, the court precluded summary
727
judgment.
Fabendv. Rosewood Hotels & Resorts, L.L. C.
In Fabend v. Rosewood Hotels & Resorts, L.L.C.,728 the Third Circuit
Court of Appeals concluded that a campground, which had a limited license to
use an adjacent beach, did not owe a duty to its guests to warn about
72 9
dangerous water conditions.
Richard Fabend was a guest at a campground, which had an agreement
with the National Park Service that allowed guests to use the governmentowned beach next to the campground.7 3 ° While bodysurfing along that beach,
Fabend injured himself when he tried to dive through a large wave. 73 1 He
brought a negligence suit against the campground and alleged that his accident
occurred because of a dangerous shorebreak condition that the campground
should have warned him about. 732 Adopting the "sphere of control" test, the
court concluded that the campground owners did not control the beach because
the agreement was a limited license that did not give any authority to the
campground owners to do so.7 3 3 Thus, the campground owners had no duty to
warn Fabend, and the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary
734
judgment to the campground owners.
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Myers v. Levy
Levy, 735

In Myers v.
the Appellate Court of Illinois concluded that a
parent's statements about a football coach created a material issue of fact for
defamation and false light invasion of privacy claims, but found that no
material issue of fact existed for the coach's other defamation claim and
prospective interference with economic advantage claim. 736
Myers, a high school football coach, brought this lawsuit for defamation,
false light, invasion of privacy, and tortious interference with prospective
economic advantage, after Levy, whose son was competing with Myers's son
at quarterback, made some negative accusations against Myers. 73 7 These
accusations were written in a letter to the school superintendent and athletic
director and a petition letter signed by several parents - although some names
were falsely reported--calling for Myers's dismissal as football coach. 738
Shortly thereafter, the athletic director and superintendent removed Myers
from his position, and The Chicago Sun-Times and The Chicago Tribune
published quotations Levy made about Myers, including how discontented
people were with Myers's coaching, how Levy led hundreds of people to have
Myers dismissed, and how Myers was an incompetent coach. 739 Because
Levy had publicly praised Myers's coaching ability on occasions prior to this
incident, the court found that a question of fact existed as to whether Levy
acted knowingly or recklessly when he petitioned the school to fire Myers;
thus, the court determined that summary judgment was inappropriate for the
defamation and false light invasion of privacy claims concerning Levy's
statements about Myers's talent as a football coach to the school and press. 740
In contrast, the court found summary judgment appropriate for Myers's other
defamation claim because Levy was able to show that many parents were truly
dissatisfied with Myers's performance. 74 1 Lastly, the court upheld summary
judgment for Myers's interference with prospective economic advantage claim
because the athletic director and school superintendent testified that Levy's
conduct had nothing to do with their decision to fire Myers. 74 2 Thus, the court
affirmed the lower court's decision in part and reversed it in part.7 43
735. 808 N.E.2d 1139 (111. App. Ct. 2004).
736. Id. at 1152-54.
737. Id. at 1143-44.
738. Id. at 1144.
739. Id. at 1145.
740. Id. at 1152.
741. Id. at 1153.
742. Id. at 1153-54.
743. Id. at 1154.
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Christopherv. Buss
In Christopherv. Buss,744 the Seventh Circuit dismissed a prisoner's claim
the Eighth
that his being injured in a prison softball game violated
74 5
punishment.
unusual
and
Amendment's prohibition on cruel
Dennis Christopher, a state prisoner, was injured during a prison softball
game when a ground ball hit a "protrusive lip" on the field and struck him in
the eye. 746 Under the Eighth Amendment's cruel and unusual punishment
provision, he sued the prison and argued that because another inmate had been
injured previously in the same way, the prison owed him a duty to repair the
field or warn him of its condition. 747 The court rejected Christopher's claims
based upon the "protrusive lip" not being serious enough to implicate the
on the field. 74 8 Thus,
Eighth Amendment and Christopher choosing to play749
the court dismissed the case for failing to state a claim.
WORKERS' COMPENSATION

Workers' compensation is only provided to professional athletes because
of their status as employees of their particular league or organization. While
workers' compensation releases the employer from negligence liability claims
by the injured employee, it also requires only a showing of the injury as
related to employment without regard for any intent requirement on the part of
the employer. In the following case the court considered whether a former
WNBA player was entitled to benefits.
Burge v. District of Columbia Department ofEmployment Services
750
In Burge v. District of Columbia Department of Employment Services,
a former
the D.C. appellate court denied workers' compensation benefits to 751
reasons.
personal
for
team
the
left
who
professional basketball player
Former professional basketball player Heidi Burge filed a workers'
compensation claim for a hip injury she suffered while playing basketball for

744. 384 F.3d 879 (7th Cir. 2004).
745. Id. at 883.
746. Id. at 880.
747. Id. at 880-81.
748. Id. at 881-83.
749. Id. at 883.
750. 842 A.2d 661 (D.C. 2004).
751. Id. at 664-67.
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the WNBA's Washington Mystics. 752 The injury occurred during a game
when Burge jumped for a rebound and fell, landing on her hip.7 53 Due to the
severity of her injury, Burge underwent treatment for several months and did
not play professional basketball during that time. 75 4 At the beginning of the
next WNBA season, Burge had improved enough to try out for and make the
team and did not complain of any pain. 75 5 However, Burge later broke her
finger, and the Mystics released her for "qualitative reasons. ' 756 After being
released, Burge turned down contracts for other basketball teams, began
pursuing alternate careers, and expressed a desire to start a family. 757 In his
initial determination, the administrative law judge found that the hip injury
Burge suffered while playing for the Mystics was the source of Burge's hip
problems, but denied her benefits because her decision to quit professional
basketball was based on personal reasons. 75 8 Because Burge voluntarily left
basketball and pursued other careers, the court found that the judge's decision
was neither arbitrary nor capricious and denied Burge workers' compensation
759
benefits.
CONCLUSION

As the cases above demonstrate, the field sports law continued to grow
throughout 2004. Sports law remains unique in the fact that it involves an
intersection with a variety of areas of law, with the growth of each area
shaping the growth of the sports law field and vice versa. While this survey
does not attempt to encompass every change that has taken place in the sports
law field over the past year, it is an attempt to demonstrate the important role
that sports law has on the growth and development of the law overall as well
as the development of sports as an institution in our society.
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